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Volume 40 Winter 1975 Number 1
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE SCOPE OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND STANDING TO
CHALLENGE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
WILLIM A. KNox*
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
In the past, the Court has often used language which refers to
standing to challenge or the scope of the amendment when it is
really deciding whether a specific remedy-the exclusionary rule-
should be available.' The Court has used language which suggests
that the defendant's rights were not involved when it is actually
denying the defendant the benefits of the exclusionary rule irrespec-
tive of whether his fourth amendment rights were violated. Such
cases misstate the true reason for denying relief and tend to confuse
and complicate civil causes of action for fourth amendment viola-
tions. These issues are becoming particularly relevant with the in-
crease in civil litigation alleging fourth amendment violations as a
ground for relief 2 It is essential to understand the history and mean-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia, B.S., North Dakota
State University, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1968.
1. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiN. L. REv. 349, 367
(1974) (hereinafter cited as Amsterdam); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search
and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1970). See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1972).
2. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also Civil Rights Acts,
1
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ing of the fourth amendment in order to evaluate intelligently the
possibilities of a successful law suit based upon fourth amendment
violations. This article will suggest that, at a minimum, the fourth
amendment was intended to protect an individual's property and
privacy interests in his person, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and unreasonable seizures, that the scope of
the amendment should be consistent with that interpretation and
that standing should be granted whenever there is an arguable
violation of the fourth amendment rights of the individual who is
seeking to challenge.
The proposals herein are not difficult to apply or understand if
the following framework of analysis is kept in mind.
1. The proposed standing rule is directly related to, but
broader than, the scope of the fourth amendment. It is consistent
with the general law of standing, and is not dependent upon any
specific interpretation being given to the exclusionary rule. How-
ever, the scope of the amendment must first be reevaluated to elimi-
nate any dependence on the exclusionary rule.
2. The present scope will first be ascertained, then the various
remedies for violation of the amendment will be examined to deter-
mine the extent to which they have affected the interpretation of the
scope of the amendment. The scope of the amendment should be
given a reasonable interpretation consistent with the amendment's
history and purpose, not an interpretation that is primarily con-
cerned with and affected by the exclusionary rule. A person should
then be granted standing to litigate if there is an arguable violation
of his fourth amendment rights. This article will propose some
guidelines for determining when these rights should be deemed to
have "arguably" been violated for purposes of granting standing.
3. The general rule of standing most frequently used by the
Court in other constitutional law cases will be compared to the
present fourth amendment standing rule. Where discrepancies are
found, it will be essential to determine whether there are good rea-
sons for the difference. It is suggested that there are differences, that
no good reason exists for these differences, and that the standing
rule announced in Association of Data Processing Service Org. v.
Camp'-' (hereinafter referred to as the Data Processing rule), with
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens; Note, The
Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968);
pt. IV of this article.
2.1. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See part
V infra, for a full discussion of the rule.
[Vol. 40
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minimal modifications, is basically sound and will work admirably
in fourth amendment cases if a reasonable scope is given to the
amendment.
No attempt Will be made to deal with whether the basic stan-
dard under the fourth amendment is one of reasonableness or one
of probable cause, the technicalities involved in the application of
those various doctrines, or the extent to which warrants are required
for searches or seizures. Those topics are the subject of numerous
judicial opinions3 and have been substantially commented upon.4
The primary purpose of this article will be to suggest an appropriate
scope for the amendment and to suggest when an individual should
have standing to litigate the issue of a violation of fourth amend-
ment rights.
I1. HISToRIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. English Precedents5
The history of searches and seizures most relevant to the fourth
amendment had its origin in England and perhaps dates back to the
early 1200's.1 It is difficult to know the scope of the power to search
3. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2464 (1974); United States v.
Edwards, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 1234 (1974); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Schneckcloth bv. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311 (1972); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
4. See, e.g., J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (1971); Amster-
dam, supra note 1.
5. The idea that a man's house is his castle subject to invasion by the state for only
certain prescribed reasons was not an invention of English jurisprudence. The concept has
been found expressed in the Biblical literature and in early Roman history. Lasson, The
History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 13-
15, in 55 JOHN HopINs U. STUDIES IN HiST. & POL. Sci. Number 2 (1937) (hereinafter cited
Lasson). The fourth amendment did, however, develop more specifically in relation to the
English precedents, so they will be the primary focus of consideration in this article. There
are numerous sources of information concerning the history of the fourth amendment, all
finding a direct causal link with English precedent. See, e.g., E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEAs TODAY (1957); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1966) (hereinafter cited LANDYrsKa); R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIOHTS (1955); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969); Dickerson,
Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1939).
6. Article 39 of the Magna Charta (1215) provided:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or seized or outlawed or exiled or in any
way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon them, except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
This was an early due process clause, but it has perhaps been interpreted more broadly than
is justified by its history. It is, however, some precedent for recognizing a need to balance
3
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and seize in the 13th and 14th centuries because evidence was rarely
presented in a criminal case. The jury was merely informed of the
crime and given a specified amount of time to investigate the case
using the methods they deemed appropriate.7 As the jury became
less independent, searches took on more importance as a means of
gathering the evidence needed for presentation in court.8 The in-
creasing number of types of crimes also contributed to the expansion
of the power to search? The power to search and seize expanded
substantially as the powers of the ruling class generally increased."°
During the 16th and 17th centuries, general warrants," which nei-
ther described nor limited the objects of the search or seizure or its
manner and time of execution, were widely used by the King and
Parliament. Writs of assistance'2 appear to have come into use later
than general warrants, but involved many of the same abuses.'"
individual liberties against the ruling class' desire for law enforcement. Lasson, supra note
5, at 20.
7. 9 HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 222 (1926); 1 HOLDSWORTH'S HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 332-37 (4th ed. 1931) (hereinafter cited HOLDSWORTH).
8. The evolution of the jury system in England is detailed in 9 HoLDswoRTH, supra note
7, at 222 et seq.
9. During the latter half of the 16th century, many orders were given for the purpose of
detection and punishment of nonconformism, seditious libel and related offenses. Lasson,
supra note 5, at 25-26. The orders issued for the detection of such offending publications and
practices seem to have been generally unlimited and messengers were given extremely broad
powers of search and arrest. Persons and places were not necessarily specified, seizures were
indiscriminate and virtually everything was left to the discretion of the bearer of the warrant.
Id. at 26.
10. In 1335, for example, an act of Parliament provided that "innkeepers in passage
ports were to search guests for false money imported and were to be rewarded with one-fourth
of any resulting forefeitures." Lesson, supra note 5, at 23. During the reign of Henry VI (1422-
61), the King granted a private company the privilege of searching for and seizing cloth dyed
with logwood. The practice of giving general search powers to certain organized trades for
enforcement of regulations was subsequently adopted by Parliament and the Court of Star
Chamber. Id. at 24.
11. A good example of a general warrant was issued in 1762 by Lord Halifax, the
Secretary of State, to four messengers ordering them "to make strict and diligent search for
the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, the North Briton,
No. 45. . .[and to arrest and seize] them or any of them. . .Together with their papers."
Lasson, supra note 5, at 43. No limits were placed on where to search or what evidence to
seize (merely all their papers). The only restrictions were an express statement of the offense
and the implicit limitation that the authority would terminate when that crime was solved.
12. Writs of assistance were usually issued by a court and directed to an individual,
such as a messenger of the Secretary of State, authorizing that individual to summon a sheriff
or constable for assistance to prevent any interference with the search. It is not clear whether
certain officials had a general search power without a writ of assistance or whether the writ
conferred the power to search. The writs were unlimited in time, place, manner, and object.
See LADYNSKI, supra note 5, at 32; Lsson, supra note 5, at 55.
13. The development of writs of assistance is thought to have become prominent either
during the reign of James I (about 1634) or by statute in 1662, although it is unclear when
4
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It was not until the latter part of the 17th century that public
opinion began to impose substantial restrictions on the power to
search. The first real limitations on the very broad and far-reaching
writs of assistance and general warrants occurred during the mid-
1600's shortly after the search and seizure of Sir Edward Coke's
papers and effects. In 1641 the Long Parliament resolved that
searching for and seizing the studies and papers of members of
Parliament and the issuance of warrants for that purpose were
breaches of privilege and illegal. 4 Although Parliament failed to
take any decisive action as to other warrants, searches, or seizures,
it did set some precedent for recognizing that the need for the ad-
ministration of justice should be balanced against the rights of indi-
vidual freedom. 5 After the revolution of 1688, assertions of privilege
against general warrants and writs of assistance became more wide-
spread in England and general searches were less frequently author-
ized by statute."6 In 1733, opponents to broad search powers de-
feated Walpole's plan to authorize general inspections of ware-
houses in order to enforce the wine and tobacco tax.
The extent of the authority to search and seize without a war-
rant during the 1700's is not clear. Writers have found strong evi-
dence of a right to arrest without a warrant for any felony or for a
misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, and to search
incident to a valid arrest. 8 There is a distinct lack of evidence,
however, of a general authority to search without a warrant absent
an arrest. In some cases there were statutes authorizing special offi-
cers to search without warrants as an aid in enforcing customs and
writs of assistance were initially issued. By 1621, members of Parliament were already recom-
mending that such warrants be issued less frequently. Lasson, supra note 5, at 27-29. They
were more widely used in America. LANDYNSmI, supra note 5, at 31.
14. Lasson, supra note 5, at 34.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 39-40. See also Lasson, supra note 5, at 38-50 for other situations in which
general warrants came under attack in the later 1600's. In 1680, the articles of impeachment
against Lord Chief Justice Scroggs charged illegality in the issuance of "general warrants for
attaching the persons and seizing the goods of his majesty's subjects, not named or described
particularly, in said warrants; by means whereof many.., have been vexed, their houses
entered into, and they themselves grievously oppressed contrary to law." The trial and con-
viction of Algernon Sidney for treason in 1683 based upon papers seized under a general
warrant has also been deemed an important event in the fourth amendment history. The
evidence consisted largely of papers which had been gathered in response to a general warrant
issued by the Privy Council. The court admitted the papers into evidence and deemed them
sufficient to make up for the absence of eye witnesses. Id. at 39 n.96.
17. Id. at 40.
18. II M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 363-66, 575-90 (1736) (hereinafter cited as HALE.
1975]
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tax laws.'" Those opposing the writs of assistance in the colonies did
not recognize the validity of such a broad power of warrantless
search. They viewed writs of assistance as being warrants conferring
the search power.2" Chief Justice Hale, in writing the History of the
Pleas of the Crown, stated that a general warrant to apprehend all
persons suspected of having committed a given crime was void and
no defense to a suit for false imprisonment.21 Hale proposed that
warrants for searches and seizures should specify the individual to
be seized and the place to be searched, both with particularity, and
that the warrants must at least be based upon some suspicion.2 He
contended that search warrants are judicial acts and must be
granted only upon an examination of the facts by a magistrate, an
individual separate and apart from the individual performing the
search. He also suggested that the searches must be reasonable, that
they should be made in the daytime, that the owner of the premises
should be present to give the officer information, that doors should
not be broken open, and that in larceny cases the goods should not
be delivered to the complainant until so ordered by the court.2
Major confrontations arising in England in the 1760's produced
the most substantial limitations on the search powers. In 1763,
William Pitt objected to the provision of the cider tax act 4 which
would have allowed the inspection of private homes for purposes of
enforcing the cider tax. Pitt thought such an invasion would be
intolerable, apparently because of an interest in the privacy of the
home. Strong opposition also developed against general warrants
19. See note 12 supra and note 44 infra.
20. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 32 n.53. See also text accompanying notes 40-44
infra.
21. See I HALE, supra note 18, at 580; H HALE, supra note 18, at 112. Sir Matthew Hale
wrote the History of the Pleas of the Crown during the 17th Century, but it was not published
until after his death.
22. II HALE, supra note 18, at 149-52. Hale's explanation of the requirements for seizing
stolen property gives an insight to the thinking of the times. He suggested that the following
were required for a valid search for stolen property. The warrant should: 1. Not be "granted
without oath made before the justice of a felony committed, and that the party complaining
has probable cause to suspect they are in such a house or place, and do show his reasons for
such suspicion; 2. Be directed to constables or other public officers, and not to private
persons; 3. Command that the goods found be brought before a justice of the peace." He
further stated that in executing the warrant the officer and the affiant may "break in if entry
is refused, but the affiant (whose goods are being searched for) would be liable for damages
for trespass if the goods are not there" (spelling modernized). See also H HALE, supra note
18, at 582.85 (arrests).
23. I HALE, supra note 18, at 150-52. See also note 16 supra.
24. Lasson, supra note 5, at 41. The cider tax was passed, but was repealed a few years
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issued for search and arrest in seditious libel cases.2 -
Perhaps the most notorious and significant case during this
period involved the 1762 arrest of John Wilkes and the seizure of all
his papers and personal effects. Wilkes authored the pamphlet The
North Briton, which criticized the English government. Lord Hali-
fax, Secretary of State, issued a general warrant ordering messen-
gers to "make strict and diligent search for the authors, printers,
and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, entitled, The
North Briton No. 45. . . and them, or any of them, having found,
to apprehend and seize, together with their papers. ' 26 In three days
the messengers arrested 49 people.2 1 Wilkes resisted peacefully, but
was carried off and committed to the tower after refusing to answer
questions. He was subsequently released on a writ of habeas corpus
because he was a member of Parliament.2 8 Wilkes and the printers
brought suit against the government. Chief Justice Pratt, in the case
of Huckle v. Money, 9 held the warrants to be illegal stating: "To
enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to
procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under
which no Englishman would wish to live for an hour.""s The jury
awarded the plaintiff in the case damages of 300 pounds and the
court allowed the award to stand .' Subsequent suits based on that
precedent also had substantial success.3 2 These cases which awarded
damages or returned the seized property have a direct bearing on
the present-day standing issue. In allowing trespass, false imprison-
ment, replevin, and trover causes of action, the cases demonstrate
that an unreasonable search or seizure by the state may constitute
an injury for which there is a corresponding judicial remedy.
25. See Rex v. Earbury, 94 Eng. Rep. 544 (K.B. 1733). This case involved a general
warrant issued by the Secretary of State. The court condemned the warrant and the manner
of executing the warrant, but decided it lacked jurisdiction over the defendant and therefore
could not order a return of the papers. See also Lasson, supra note 5, at 43.
26. Lasson, supra note 5, at 43. Wilkes was a member of Parliament at the time.
27. Id. at 43. Some were taken from their beds in the middle of the night.
28. Id. at 44. See the case of John Wilkes, on Habeas Corpus, 19 Howell's State Trials
981 (1763).
29. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763). The plaintiff, a printer of the North Briton, alleged
trespass, assault, and false imprisonment. Wilkes was not a party to the suit.
30. Id. at 769.
31. Lasson, supra note 5, at 43-44. Huckle had been imprisoned for only six hours
during which time he was treated to beefsteaks and beer. The case has been considered one
of the earliest allowing punitive damages.
32. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.B. 1763). In Wilkes, the court upheld
an award of 1000 pounds against Wood, who supervised the execution of the general warrant.
It has been estimated that the North Briton warrant cost the Crown a total of 100,000 pounds
in litigation expenses and damages. Lasson, supra note 5, at 45.
19751
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Wilkes received widespread recognition both in England and
America for his stand against general warrants, and engaged in
considerable communication with some leading Americans in the
1760's. 3 Wilkes' success apparently prompted John Entick to
commence a civil suit challenging his arrest and the seizure of his
papers under a general warrant.3 4 The resulting case, Entick v.
Carrington,35 has been regularly cited by the United States Supreme
Court as a historical precedent for the fourth amendment.3 6
The English cases subsequently led the House of Commons in
1766 to declare that general warrants in libel cases were illegal.37
Shortly thereafter William Pitt also persuaded the House to declare
illegal all general warrants not specifically authorized by an act of
Parliament.3 8 It was during this period that Pitt made his famous
comment:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces
of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the sun may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of
England may not enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold
of that ruined tenement.3 1
English history indicates that the objection to searches and
seizures was not merely to the entering of the man's house, the
seizure of certain very limited items of evidence, or the arrest of
particular individuals. Much of the objection was aimed at the ex-
tent and nature of the seizures, the arrests of individuals on mere
suspicion, the nature and timing of such arrests, and also the gen-
eral nature of the warrants. The concern with searching houses as
opposed to businesses, and the importance placed on papers seems
strong evidence of a consideration for privacy in determining when
searches are improper.
33. Lasson, supra note 5, at 46. He is known to have communicated with James Otis,
Samuel Adams, John Hancock, John Adams, and Josiah Quincy.
34. Id. at 47. Entick's arrest occurred about six months before Wilkes' arrest.
35. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). This was a trespass action against messengers of the
King alleging that their entry and seizure of papers on a charge of seditious libel was illegal.
36. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 617 (1886), citing the cases involving John
Wilkes and the North Briton and Entick v. Carrington, supra note 35, as having a direct
bearing on the meaning and purpose of the fourth amendment.
37. Lasson, supra note 5, at 49. At the time these cases were being decided, the chal-
lenges primarily involved the libel laws and probably also contributed to the first amendment
to the United States Constitution. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 27-28.
38. William Pitt was not successful in getting a condemnation of general warrants for
arrests, however, nor a prohibition on warrants to seize papers. See Lasson, supra note 5, at
49.
39. Id. at 49-50. The objection was probably not aimed at the total security of the home.
The objections were to indiscriminate and open-ended warrants and searches.
[Vol. 40
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B. Colonial Precedents
The historical background in the United States is not substan-
tially different from that in England except that writs of assistance
were perhaps more widely used." The writs of assistance, used in
America to combat smuggling, were not even particular as to a
specific violation of the law.4 They were, in effect, permanent
search warrants giving customs officials unlimited discretion to
search wherever and whenever they pleased. These writs were first
granted by the courts in 1755 after protests against searches made
without them.4 2 They were valid as long as the sovereign lived.43
When George II died in 1760, opponents to the writs of assistance
prepared to challenge the issuance of new writs.44
When application was made in 1761 to the Superior Court of
Massachusetts for a new writ of assistance, sixty-three Massachu-
setts businessmen hired James Otis, Jr. and Oxenbridge Thatcher
to oppose the issuance. 45 Attorney General Gridley, representing the
provincial government, argued that there was no right of privacy as
against the King.4" Otis47 argued that the writs violated liberty,
fundamental principles of law, and the privilege of an individual's
house. He contended that only specific warrants could be issued
under the statutes and that "an act against natural equity is void.14
Otis, specifically citing Dr. Bonham's Case,49 contended that there
40. Id. at 51. The technical difference between general warrants and writs of assistance
is discussed in notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text supra.
41. Id. at 43-44. General warrants at least mentioned a specific crime, often committed
at a specific time. Writs of assistance, on the other hand, were general powers to search
whenever or wherever necessary for forcing compliance with the law.
42. The first writ of assistance was issued to Charles Paxton, who held the title
"Surveyor and Searcher of the Port of Boston." INmYNsIu, supra note 5, at 32.
43. Id. at 31. Actually custom recognized their validity for six months after the death
of the sovereign.
44. Id. at 33. It is not clear that the writs of assistance were the source of the power to
search. Some historians believe the power to search was inherent in the office of the customs
inspectors. The challenge to the writs was ultimately successful on the theory that the writs
were the source of power, so that assumption must carry through in evaluating the historical
message.
45. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 33.
46. Id. at 34. Gridley also argued that the writs were actually a limitation on the
unlimited search power which he said was inherent in the customs official's position.
47. During the 1760's, Otis had communicated with Wilkes in England and may have
been aware of Wilkes' activities with respect to general warrants. Lasson, supra note 5, at 46
n.114.
48. LIANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 34. Thatcher confined his arguments to the applica-
bility of the English statutes in the colonies.
49. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P. 1669). In Dr. Bonham's Case, Coke asserted in dictum that
an individual could not be the judge of a situation if he had an interest in the outcome. He
9
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was a need for judicial review of warrants" and suggested that the
customs officials were not the appropriate officials to determine the
need for the search." The court, however, granted the writ of assis-
tance after a reargument. 2 The following day, November 23, 1761,
the Boston Gazette wrote in reference to Otis' argument that,
The arguments. . . were enforced with such strength of reason, as
did great honor to the gentleman concerned; and nothing could
have induced one to believe they were not conclusive, but the
Judgment of the Court [was] immediately given in favor of the
Petition.53
In 1761, the Massachusetts Legislature passed a bill outlawing
general warrants and writs of assistance, but it was vetoed by the
Governor. 4 The language of the act is significant in that it did not
assert a standard of reasonableness but rather required that the
warrant be specific.5 Active opposition to writs of assistance waned
during the next three years,55 but in 1765 the writs again came under
vigorous attack in response to the passage of the Stamp Act.17
Massachusetts was not the only colony engaged in opposition
to writs of assistance, although reaction there was the most vocal,
open, and notorious. Except for Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire, the colonies generally refused to issue new writs of assistance
spoke of natural law and equity and asserted that acts of Parliament inconsistent with natural
law were void.
50. Although Coke had admitted that his assertions in Dr. Bonham's Case were not an
accurate statement of the law, they were significant in the formulation of the concept of
judicial review. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 35 n.72.
51. Id. See also note 47 supra.
52. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 35.
53. QUINCY's MASS. REPORTS, 1761-1772, at 486 (hereinafter cited as QUINCY). In
December 1761, the Gazette called for all people to apply for writs of assistance, suggesting
the language of the statutes was so broad that the writs were available for the asking. Id. at
487-88.
54. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 35.
55. An act for the better enabling the Officers of his Majesty's Customs to
carry the Acts of Trade into Execution .... and for the preventing of fraud:
[authorizes the courts to issue writs of assistance if presented upon oath] that he
has had information of the Breach of any of the Acts of Trade; and that he verily
believes or knows such Information to be true; . . . which Writ or Warrant of
Assistance shall be in the form following and no other ....
The act also provided that the Court must name the individual suspected, and that the search
must be carried out in the daytime. QUINCY, supra note 53, at 495.
56. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 36. From 1762 to 1765, apparently 14 other writs of
assistance were issued. A committee appointed by the Governor to review the legality of the
writs found them to be legal.
57. Id. at 36.
58. See QUINcY, supra note 53, at 442; LANDYNsKi, supra note 5, at 36.
[Vol. 40
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/10
FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING
after the death of George H.59 This opposition continued until the
Revolutionary War. The petition for a redress of grievances submit-
ted to the King in October of 1774 by the Continental Congress
complained that "[t]he officers of the Customs are empowered to
break open and enter houses, without the authority of any civil
magistrate, founded on legal information. '" This objection may
also have been contained in spirit in the Declaration of Independ-
ence, where objection was made to the Crown having sent "hither
swarms of officers to harass our people." The objections were consis-
tent with those raised in England: privacy, property and arbitrari-
ness.
Prior to the meeting of the constitutional convention in 1787,
most of the colonies had adopted specific limitations on the use of
general warrants and writs of assistance."' When the constitutional
59. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 36-37. In Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, no writs were granted by the courts during this period. The
requests for the writs were often denied or merely ignored. The South Carolina courts refused
the writs until 1773.
60. Lasson, supra note 5, at 75; LANDYNsIU, supra note 5, at 38. For a more complete
discussion see QuiNcY, supra note 53, at 466-67.
61. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A DocumENrARY HMsToRY (1971), contains many
of the more important documents. Article X of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776
provided:
[t]hat general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person
or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
Id. at 235. The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided in Article X:
that the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and posses-
sions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths or affirma-
tions first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer
or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize
any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described, are contrary
to that right, and ought not be granted.
Id. at 265. The North Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided in Article XI:
that general warrants-whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed, or to seize any
person or persons, not named, whose offenses are not particularly described, and
supported by evidence-are dangerous to liberty, and ought not be granted.
Id. at 287. The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 provided in Article XIV:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore,
are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer,
to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or
to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons
or objects of search, arrest or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in
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convention met, its members did not consider a bill of rights until
five days before the convention adjourned. They then decided
against it without substantial consideration. 2 The states, of course,
ratified the Constitution without a bill of rights. In recommending
that the Constitution be amended to include a bill of rights, James
Madison specifically argued that because Congress was empowered
to do everything necessary and proper with regard to imposing cer-
tain kinds of taxes, it was at least foreseeable that Congress might
deem it necessary and proper to use general warrants or writs of
assistance in enforcing the tax laws. 3 Madison's solution to the
problem of searches and seizures was the following clause:
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or
things to be seized."4
The draft proposal was referred to the congressional committee
responsible for drafting a bill of rights and was altered to read as
follows:
the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing with-
out probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."'
The word "secured" was subsequently altered to read "secure" and
the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" which was omitted
from the committee's draft was reinserted.66 The only major change
was insertion of the word "effects" for the words "other property."6 7
62. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 39.
63. Lasson, supra note 5, at 99. See also Lasson at 91-100 for an excellent discussion of
some of the arguments relating to the need to limit governmental power to search. Jefferson
was in France at the time, and was one of the vigorous proponents of the Bill of Rights, as
were Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Robert Yates of New York, and Luther Martin of
Maryland. Id. at 85-90. Opponents of a bill of rights argued that the listing of restrictions
upon government action implied that the central government was not one of limited power.
This approach was taken by Sherman during the constitutional convention, and was also
argued by James Wilson and other Federalists in supporting the adoption of the Constitution
without the Bill of Rights. Id. at 85-90.
64. L~ADYNSKI, supra note 5, at 41; Lasson, supra note 5, at 97.
65. Lasson, supra note 5, at 100.
66. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 41; Lasson, supra note 5, at 101.
67. The reason for the change is not clear. "Other property" is probably broad enough
[Vol. 40
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Benson objected to the words "shall not be violated by warrants
issuing" as not being strong enough language and recommended to
the committee that the words "shall not be violated and no warrant
shall issue" be inserted in lieu thereof. 8 Although this version was
initially rejected by the House, it was subsequently reinserted in the
draft by Benson, who was a member of the subcommittee which was
in charge of putting the Bill of Rights in final form for House and
Senate consideration.69 The bill as then submitted by Benson was
approved by both Houses of Congress and ratified by the states."
The choice of words in the fourth amendment is particularly
significant. It is not limited to general warrants or writs of assistance
as were the Virginia, Pennsylvania and many other state declara-
tions of rights.71 In fact, both drafts of the fourth amendment that
were considered dealt with unreasonable searches and seizures.
The final draft follows the Massachusetts pattern73 of recognizing a
general right of freedom" from unreasonable searches and seizures
and is consistent with Otis' argument concerning general principles
of liberty.74 It would be a mistake to assume that merely because the
most serious abuses resulted from the writs of assistance and general
warrants that the only purpose of the fourth amendment was to
prohibit those abuses. 75
to cover both real and personal property, which would have a definite bearing on the scope
of the amendment. If "other property" had been retained, no difficulty would have been
encountered in bringing "open fields," buildings, etc., within the scope of the amendment.
The word effects, however, is probably not broad enough to include real property, although
it clearly includes intangibles. See BLACK's LAw DicroNARY 605 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). I have
been unable to find any definition of effects which includes real property.
68. LANDYNSKI, supra note 5, at 41; Lasson, supra note 5, at 101-02. Benson (a United
States Representative from New York) was a member of the house committee charged with
drafting a bill of rights.
69. Lasson, supra note 5, at 101-03; LANDYNsKI, supra note 5, at 42.
70. LANDYNsIU, supra note 5, at 42; Lasson, supra note 5, at 102-07.
71. See note 61 supra.
72. See Lasson, supra note 5, at 98-103. The records seem to indicate that the omission
of "unreasonable searches and seizures" from the second draft was treated as an oversight
and promptly corrected. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
73. See note 61 supra.
74. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
75. LDYNsKi, supra note 5, at 45. Another important consideration not particularly
relevant to the standing issue is the relationship between the reasonableness clause and the
warrant clause of the fourth amendment. There are three possible interpretations of the
relationship between the two clauses: 1) only reasonable searches are permissible, and if a
proper warrant has been issued it is per se reasonable; 2) that the warrant requirement must
be complied with and the search or seizure must also be reasonable; 3) that the reasonable-
ness clause grants a power to conduct reasonable searches and seizures, and some searches
may be reasonable even though no warrant is secured. History is not conclusive on which
alternative is correct, but it is clear that there was no intention of granting an unlimited power
1975]
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Reading the fourth amendment in a fair manner and giving
reasonable weight to its history would provide at least the following
guidelines: 1) the amendment applies a standard of reasonableness
to all searches of persons, houses, papers, and effects and all seizures
of persons, houses, papers and effects.7" It is not limited to situations
where both a search and a seizure occur; 7 2) warrants, when re-
quired, must meet the requirements of clause two of the amend-
ment;7 and 3) the amendment was intended to protect both prop-
erty interests and some privacy interests against arbitrary and un-
reasonable infringement by the federal government.79 Thus, while
the fourth amendment recognizes that the government has more
power than private citizens, it also limits the scope of that power.
to search. It is also unlikely that there was an intention to change the common law authorizing
searches without any warrant if incident to a valid arrest.
76. Warrantless arrests were permitted for felonies and misdemeanors committed in the
presence of law enforcement officials. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. It is doubt-
ful that Congress or the people intended to require a warrant in situations where it is clearly
impractical to obtain one, such as a search incident to an arrest. See United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). However, it is also
fair to assume that the warrantless search or seizure must still be reasonable. Also the warrant
requirements of the fourth amendment clearly relate to the issue of the validity of general
warrants and writs of assistance which were, without question, intended to be invalidated by
the fourth amendment. But see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, (1973)
(Powell, J. concurring); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, (1972); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); which all authorize general warrants on a variety of theories,
basically because the purpose of the search was not to acquire evidence for a criminal prosecu-
tion.
77. A seizure is not always preceded by a search. For example, the seizure of a car is
not exempt from the fourth amendment merely because a search does not have to be con-
ducted to locate it. There must be at least some evidence to justify the seizure (i.e. probable
cause to believe it is evidence of a crime or contraband. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Elkins, 245 Ore. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966). But see Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). So also a person may not be seized merely because he is in plain
view. There must be sufficient cause under the fourth amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). The same is true of searches. An officer may not search
your house without probable cause merely because he seizes nothing.
78. See note 76 supra.
79. Historians have not seriously questioned the intention of protecting property rights.
Many of the remedies in the 1700's were property related causes of action, such as trespass
and replevin. A more substantial question is the desire to protect an interest in privacy. Many
of the earliest United States Supreme Court cases recognized this interest. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). The court has consistently
recognized this right. Many of the historical statements by opponents to general warrants also
suggest, at least, an interest in privacy of the home. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
See also Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974). To be consistent with the
history, both property and privacy rights must be protected.
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II. THE PRESENT SCOPE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN CRIMINAL
CASES"0
The basic questions in defining scope are whether a particular
activity constitutes a search or a seizure and what fits within the
fourth amendment catagories: person, house, paper, and effect. The
question of whether the search or seizure is reasonable"1 arises only
after it is determined that a search or seizure of a person, house,
paper, or effect took place. Nevertheless, a few additional considera-
tions should be kept in mind. First, the fourth amendment was
never intended to be, and probably should not be deemed to be, the
cure-all which prohibits all possible abuses by the police in gather-
ing evidence." Second, the available historical material does not
clearly answer all the questions concerning the scope of the fourth
amendment. This is understandable, since those who drafted the
Bill of Rights were not necessarily all of one mind, and there were
disputes as to the protections to be afforded as well as the language
to be employed.s3 The third consideration is that the fourth amend-
ment does not prohibit governmental searches and seizures or inva-
sions of privacy, it merely requires a certain amount of justification
80. Civil causes of action for fourth amendment violations are not very helpful in
defining the scope of the amendment because they have not yet become substantial in num-
ber and those that are brought tend to involve individuals who are totally innocent of any
crime and who clearly come within the protection of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. "388 (1971). Cases are starting to arise, however. See
California Banker's Ass'n v. Shultz, note 263 infra and O'Shea v. Littleton, note 264 infra.
Other cases, such as those concerned with the constitutional right of privacy, are excluded
from this analysis because they generally involve constitutional provisions other than the
fourth amendment. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 460 (1973); 11
DUQUESNE L. REv. 165 (1972); 51 N.C.L. REv. 1530 (1973) (dealing with Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act); Note, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 263 (1974); 51 TEXAS L. Rnv. 602 (1973); Annot., 57
A.L.R. 3rd 16 (1974).
81. The reasonableness, warrant, and probable cause requirements, while always
relevant in the fourth amendment cases, apply only if a search or seizure takes place. If there
is no search or seizure, there is no need to comply with the fourth amendment requirements
of reasonableness or probable cause. See Amsterdam, note 1 supra.
82. The fourth amendment is aimed at certain types of conduct and activities and to
the extent the government engages in activities reasonably within the framework of the fourth
amendment, it is not an abuse of judicial power to so construe it. It should also be remem-
bered that other constitutional provisions protect against certain objectionable activities, for
example, fifth amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination; first amend-
ment protection of speech, association and religion; sixth amendment right of counsel, etc. I
do not overlook the point of view that the Constitution is a "living instrument" which must
be interpreted to be consistent with the modem world.
83. See text accompanying notes 63-70 supra; Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 395-96. The
language of the amendment, however, must be the guide which is followed.
1975]
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for the activities.14 Finally, due to the broad applicability of the
exclusionary rule, the Court has tended to restrict its definitions of
"search" and "seizure" because it does not believe that exclusion
is an appropriate remedy for a minor infringement of rights.85
The Supreme Court, very early, began giving the fourth amend-
ment what might be called an expansive reading. In Ex parte
Jackson," for example, dictum suggested that the search of a closed
envelope in the possession of the post office would arguably consti-
tute a violation of the addressee's fourth amendment rights where
there was no warrant or probable cause for the search. 7 The Court
did not limit its language to searches for evidence of criminal activi-
ties, but included inspections for the purpose of enforcing post office
regulations dealing with what constitutes mailable material. In
Boyd v. United States,88 a noncriminal case, the Court held that a
subpoena duces tecum to deliver a party's documents to be used
against him in a forfeiture of property proceeding was an infringe-
ment on the individual's right of privacy and violated the fourth
amendment.89 The Court recognized that an order to produce evi-
dence involves basically the same objections as would be involved
if the police performed the search. These decisions are consistent
with the historical concept that the people have a right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their "papers"; they
have a right of privacy."
84. The fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures.
85. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 381. The primary problem is that the Court often
uses standing in the context of whether the individual is entitled to the benefits of the
exclusionary rule. See White & Greenspan, supra note 1. As a result, if the Court does not
contemplate allowing the exclusionary rule as a remedy, it will often not seriously consider
whether the fourth amendment was actually violated. See also Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STANFORD L. REV. 1027 (1974), for an excellent discussion of the
problem.
86. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). See also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970),
citing Jackson with approval.
87. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, supra note 86, stating that papers are protected
"wherever they may be." 397 U.S. at 251. The package had been detained by the post office
for about 29 hours. The Court held that to be a seizure.
88. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). This was only the fifth time that the Court considered the
fourth amendment. The four earlier cases were: Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448
(1806) (arrest comes within fourth amendment); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71
(1855) (fourth amendment not applicable to the states); Murray v. Hoboken Land and Im-
provement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) (fourth amendment not applicable to purely
civil proceedings); and Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) (dealing with opening envelopes
by the Post Office Department.)
89. Id. For example, if the fourth amendment could be avoided by merely ordering the
defendant to empty out his pockets or his house, little protection would remain.
90. Otis and others recognized an individual's need for privacy at least in the home.
History does not suggest that it was necessarily limited to the home. See Entick v. Carrington,
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The expansive interpretation of the scope of the fourth amend-
ment, although somewhat slowed after Boyd,9" usually resulted in
finding a "search" whenever there was an attempt to discover evi-
dence that was not in "plain view."9 Subsequent cases held that a
search could be committed not only by physical entry or trespass,93
but also by the senses of sight,94 and hearing95 if there was an inva-
sion of privacy in person, houses, papers, or effects. The courts, for
example, have held that searches occurred when chairs were used
to get a better view into a window," or sound amplification devices
were used to enable a person to hear better.97 It would also be a
search to take blood samples from the body,9" remove bullets,99 or
subject the body or baggage to x-ray instruments to peer inside."'
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). It is important to note,
however, that much of the early English and American search law developed with respect to
property interests with privacy consideration being largely a matter of aggravation of the
wrong. See note 79 supra, and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763); Wilkes v. Wood,
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763). In later cases the courts clearly recognized that the protection to be
afforded papers by the fourth amendment involved interests in privacy. See cases cited in
note 86 supra. A good summary to privacy as a separate ground for relief can be found in
Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 16 (1974). See also articles cited note 80 supra. Perhaps the most signi-
ficant single article which led to the development of a body of law dealing with privacy in
the United States is Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
91. See, e.g., Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
92. See note 106 infra. Early cases took the position that the "eye could not commit a
search." See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). They did recognize, however, that
the taking and carrying away of property or papers constituted a seizure of those papers. See,
e.g., Wilkes v. Woods, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
93. The early requirement for a search was finding an infringement on property rights.
There was no specific consideration of privacy. See Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.
1968). The requirement of a physical entry or trespass caused the Court to interpret the terms
"houses, papers, and effects" very broadly. The fourth amendment was held to protect places
of business, apartments, garages, automobiles, clothing, cabinets, envelopes, etc. See Ams-
terdam, supra note 1, at 357; text accompanying notes 124-129 infra.
94. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Anspach v. United States, 305
F.2d 48 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962).
95. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
96. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
97. Katz v. United States, supra note 95. See also, Note Minimization of the Fourth
Amendment, 19 N.Y.L. FORUM 861 (1974) for a general discussion of the law of electronic
eavesdropping.
98. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
99. See generally Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which suggests that any
intrusion into the body causing hidden objects to be revealed is a search. This would likely
encompass at least the extraction of bullets.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
947 (1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), dealing with the FAA
profile and electronic check for metal. If the rationale dealing with airport searches of baggage
also applies to the body, it would seem that subjecting a person to x-rays would be a search.
These airport searches have been the subject of numerous comments. See, e.g., 26 U. FLA. L.
REv. 329 (1974); 34 LA. L. REv. 860 (1974); 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 258 (1974).
1975]
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In each instance above, designating the activity a search is consis-
tent with the historical purpose of the fourth amendment even
though some of the activities, such as electronic surveillance, were
not contemplated by the drafters of the amendment. In each case
there is an invasion of a property or privacy interest.
In deciding whether an activity constitutes a search, the Court
now frequently places emphasis on whether there was an invasion
of a reasonable expectation of privacy.101 Courts have been reluctant
to consider the unaided' use of the senses of sight, hearing, or smell
to be a search in cases where the law enforcement officer did not
engage in any trespass or physical invasion of the area occupied by
defendants. The use of flashlights"°3 or binoculars"4 is also not nor-
mally deemed an invasion of privacy."5 The Court has consistently
taken the position that the discovery of items in plain view does not
constitute a search. 0
In defining seizure, the litigation has frequently been concerned
with what constitutes the seizure of a person.' The courts have
generally taken the view that any detention of a person against his
will is a seizure.0 8 The word seizure, however, refers to the acquisi-
tion of control over any tangible' or intangible"' property including
101. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8, 14-15 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1968). See also Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2468, 2470 (1974).
In Cardwell, the plurality speaks of a "right of privacy" and later of the defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy.
102. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
103. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); United States v. Callahan, 256 F. Supp.
739 (D. Minn. 1964).
104. State v. Hawkins, 482 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. 1972). See 27 OKLA. L. REv. 243 (1974).
105. Katz v. United States, supra note 95. The exemptions for binoculars and flash-
lights was a recognition that the police must be able to use reasonable means of discovery.
Use of such instruments should, however, be deemed a search. But see Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
106. Defining plain view is itself a problem. Recently the Court has not been able to
muster a majority opinion in the difficult "plain view" cases. See Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. _, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974). The open
fields doctrine, although technically not "persons, houses, papers or effects," also appears to
be potentially a "plain view" approach. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
"View" probably is not limited to sight, but would include hearing, smell, and perhaps touch.
107. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Most criminal litigation in this area involves the legality of the search, not the seizure.
However, there are exceptions. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); United States
v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
108. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973). Cases are rare where an individual other
than a suspect has his liberty restrained against his will and-brings an action to challenge
the detention. Cf. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (incarceration of a witness).
109. See Sibron v. New York, supra note 107.
110. See Katz v. United States, supra note 95.
[Vol. 40
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guns,' clothes,' papers, 13 hair samples,'" voice exemplars,"'
words in communication,"' and other information whether acquired
by photograph,"17 other duplication,"' or even perhaps by memoriza-
tion of the contents."9 These decisions are at least not inconsistent
with the historical meaning of the term "seizure" in that they in-
volve the assertion of control over something.'20 To consider wire-
tapping to be a seizure subject to the fourth amendment 2"' protec-
tion is also consistent with the fourth amendment's historical pur-
pose to protect communications (papers), the telephone merely
being a more modem method of communication. 22 Expanding the
definition to include memorization of the contents of letters or the
recording of communications would be proper since memorization
involves the same type of privacy invasion as would taking posses-
sion of the item. In practice, however, the seizure of intangibles will
be of less importance because the means of discovery (search) will
be the primary subject of litigation.
111. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
112. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
113. Boyd v. United States, supra note 88.
114. Taking a hair or skin sample should be deemed a seizure and treated like the
seizure of any other tangible item. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), suggesting
that taking scrapings from under the fingernails is a search and seizure.
115. The voice exemplar cases have primarily dealt with grand jury subpoenas. The
rationale of Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (police dragnet), however, should be
applicable. See also United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972). But see United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973)
(handwriting samples). It is not clear how far the Court will go in this area. Davis can be
distinguished as a seizure of the individual. See 57 MNN. L. REV. 1157 (1973).
116. Katz v. United States, supra note 95. It is not clear whether the Court considered
this a seizure.
117. See Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
118. Id.
119. This involves the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine as well as the legality of any
search or seizure. In Katz v. United States, supra note 95, the acquisition of the communi-
cation could nevertheless be viewed as a seizure although the primary ground for relief was
that the method of discovery was an illegal search.
120. It is also conceivable that ordering an individual not to leave a given area or not
to dispose of a particular piece of property could be deemed a seizure, although the inter-
ference with individual freedom and property rights may be much less. See United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970). This issue came close to being resolved in Hurtado
v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (incarceration of material witness prior to trial), but
the issue was not reached.
121. Katz v. United States, supra note 95.
122. A liberal interpretation of the words "search and seizure" does no real violence to
the historical meaning of the fourth amendment. Where the activity is essentially the same
as that controlled by the amendment, there is no reason not to allow a liberal interpretation.
Expansion has taken place primarily in the context of invasions of privacy rights, which the
amendment was intended to protect.
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Although virtually anything can be searched and/or seized, 2 in
order for the fourth amendment to be controlling, the search or
seizure must be of a person, house, paper or effect. The term "per-
son" has been interpreted to mean the person and the apparel' that
he is wearing. "Houses" include structures12 where people live,
work, and play, and may include other containers 21 such as automo-
biles, boats, and telephone booths when occupied. "Papers and
effects" include all personal property,1 ' both tangible and intangi-
ble. The only real expansion in these definitions which may be
inconsistent with history is the definition of houses to include vir-
tually all buildings and the curtilage.1rs This expansion, however, to
the extent limited to recent developments not foreseen by those who
drafted the Constitution is not necessarily improper if consistent
with the theory of the amendment.1 29
It must always be remembered that the fourth amendment
applies only to governmental searches and seizures of persons,
houses, papers, and effects. 3 ' The amendment is not a limitation on
private persons unless they act as agents 3 ' of the government. The
reader is asked to assume, hereafter, that references to searches and
seizures mean searches or seizures by government officials of per-
sons, houses, papers, or effects.
123. Since the "mere evidence rule" was eliminated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967), all evidence of crime, as well as fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband could
be searched for and seized. Katz v. United States, supra note 95, recognized that an intangi-
ble such as a conversation could be searched for and implicitly recognized that acquisition
of the conversations was a seizure. See also note 183 infra for a discussion of the "mere
evidence rule."
124. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
125. Recent cases such as Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), make reference
to "premises" rather than to "houses." See Stover v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel
rooms); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garage); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932) (place of business).
126. All personal property comes within the term "effects." Personal property that
contains people may also be deemed "houses." See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) (occupied car referred to as though it is
treated the same as a house); United States v. Coppolo, 2 F. Supp. 115 (D.C.N.J. 1932).
127. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); cases cited notes 109-119 supra.
It is interesting to speculate on the reasons Madison's proposed wording "and their other
property" was changed to "effects." See note 65 supra. Interpreting "effects" to include all
items of personal property is consistent with the amendment.
128. See, e.g., Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 432
(1956). Open fields are not protected. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
129. See note 122 supra.
130. The federal government is limited because that was the clear intention of the Bill
of Rights. The expansion to include the states in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), is not
consistent with the history of the amendment, but is not particularly important to the issues
discussed herein, other than that a change in the law will have an effect on the states.
131. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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The fourth amendment clearly applies to criminal investiga-
tions and is also considered important in what might be termed
quasi-criminal matters, 132 but the Court has generally taken the
position that the amendment is not applicable to purely civil mat-
ters. 33 The extent to which the government is limited by the fourth
amendment may depend on the purpose of the search and seizure.
The amount of justification needed to make a search reasonable
varies with the type of crime '34 and search involved, 13 5 such as a
broader search, 6 inventory search,3  inspection,", or a search to
enforce business, 139 safety, "' or traffic' regulations. In quasi-
criminal matters, a lesser standard of justification may be sufficient
to make the search reasonable.4
Not all discovery of evidence by the government, however, is
subject to fourth amendment control. Under the present law, corpo-
rations may have limited fourth amendment rights.1 3 A grand
132. Historically, there is no requirement that it be so limited. See See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (fire hazard inspection of commercial warehouses); United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (reports in compliance with Federal Trade Commis-
sion order); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (subpoena duces tecum
issued in the course of investigation pursuant to Fair Labor Standards Act).
133. See Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 227 (1855),
in which the Court held that the fourth amendment was not applicable to summary seizures
to satisfy debts to the United States since there was no search warrant involved. The Court
recognized a long history of summary methods for satisfaction of debts, and treated the case
primarily as raising due process issues. See In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973).
134. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
135. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Interestingly, one of the reasons the
fourth amendment was included in the Constitution was the fear of the use of general war-
rants to aid in the collection of taxes. This could well be some evidence that the fourth
amendment was not intended merely to limit the acquisition of evidence of crime.
136. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Justice Powell's con-
curring opinion is interesting in that he would appear to be willing to find that a "general
warrant" is valid. See also United States v. Cristancho-Puerto, 475 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 869 (1973).
137. United States v. Edwards, - U.S. _, 94 S.Ct. 1234 (1974).
138. See note 134 supra; Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
139. See note 134 supra.
140. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). This appears to be a "general
warrant."
141. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
993 (1966); Montana v. Tomich, 332 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1964).
142. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
143. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, -U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 1494 (1974), where
the Court states:
. . . corporations can claim no equity with the individuals in the enjoyment of a
right of privacy. . . . Even if one were to regard the request for information in this
case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing
agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is
19751
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jury"' does not need any cause to subpoena people,4 5 or handwriting
exemplars.' The Internal Revenue Service needs no justification to
summon tax records, "7 and tax reporting requirements are not per
se violations of the fourth amendment.' Open fields are unpro-
tected, "9 the exercise of "plain view"'' is not a search at all, nor is
simple trickery in obtaining information or property through an
informer or undercover police officer."' The fourth amendment pro-
vides little, if any protection against stops of automobiles for the
purpose of driver's license and safety checks,"2 or the search of
consistent with the law and the public interest.
94 S.Ct. at 1519-20. But see Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920). One might ask whether the same can be said with respect to individual rights. In
California Bankers Ass'n the Court viewed the reporting requirements as reasonable. 94 S.Ct.
at 1520. The Court also denied the individual plaintiffs standing since there was no showing
that any of their transactions had to be reported and they, therefore, could show no injury.
144. Grand juries are entitled to special privileges. See United States v. Calandra,
U.S. . 94 S.Ct. 613 (1974) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine not applicable). See also
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (subpoena of tax records not a seizure invading
privacy); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973) (not a search
or seizure). But see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
145. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
146. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (either no invasion of privacy or not a
search).
147. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 522 (1971), cited with approval in
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, supra note 143, at 94 S.Ct. 1513.
148. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), cited with approval in California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, supra note 143, at 94 S.Ct. 1517; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107 (1911). Such reporting requirements are generally justified by the need to acquire infor-
mation in order to have effective tax laws.
149. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). It appears as though the Court's
rationale was that this was not a house or effect. See also Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d
361, 363 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 330 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850 (1964), for
an application of the open fields doctrine, allowing the police to crawl under a cabin with-
out the fourth amendment being applicable since the area was under a rented motel cabin
and was so close to the open fields.
150. Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The plain view doctrine basically states that what the police
observe through the exercise of their senses of sight, hearing, and smell does not constitute a
search. The major problem in applying the doctrine is whether the officer was occupying a
proper observation point, or whether his presence itself invaded the defendant's rights. In
McDonald, supra note 94, the Court seemed to take the position that standing on a chair to
get a better view of the interior of an apartment was a fourth amendment violation and not
consistent with plain view. For a good discussion see Note, Plain View-Anything But Plain,
7 Lo oLA U. oF LA. L. REv. 489 (1974).
151. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (privacy interest waived by voluntarily
providing the information). The police, for example, might purchase an item with the in-
tention to use it as evidence, such as a drug purchase.
152. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
993 (1966). It is not clear whether this is an area where the fourth amendment is inapplicable
or whether a lesser standard of justification is required as in Biswell, Camara, and Almeida-
Sanchez, supra notes 134, 136, 140. The stopping of an automobile would seem to constitute
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people, homes, papers, or effects if the individual has no "reason-
able expectation of privacy" with respect thereto.'5 3 The "reason-
able expectation of privacy" rationale has been used, for example,
when dealing with the subpoena of tax records in the accountant's
possession 54 and compelling production of voice and handwriting
exemplars. 55 In some cases, the fourth amendment has also been
deemed inapplicable where the search or seizure involved acquisi-
tion of evidence for use in noncriminal proceedings. 15 Exempt also
is the seizure of abandoned property.157 In Cardwell v. Lewis, 5' four
members of the Court have also apparently concluded that the
chemical analysis of paint taken from the defendant's automobile
a seizure of the person and the vehicle (effects). For a discussion of the issue see Note,
Automobile Spot Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 6 Ruoans-CiFNa L.J. 85 (1974).
153. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. ., 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974) (paint from
automobile); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (person); Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973) (papers); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972) (liquor).
154. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1972). In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 73 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867.
155. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand jury subpoena); United States
v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973). But see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
156. See note 133 supra. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
157. See Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v.
Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2nd Cir. 1966). This view is very much consistent with history since,
once property is in fact abandoned, no one has a property or privacy right in it until some
person reacquired possession. See also People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971), vacated, 409
U.S. 33 (1972), noted 1974 Wisc. L. REv. 212. Cases like State v. Browner, 514 S.W.2d 355
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974), are good examples of the confusion that results from a failure to
comprehend the basic nature of standing. The defendant was a guest in an automobile, and
had a briefcase on his lap. He fled the vehicle and left the briefcase behind when the police
stopped the car. The court held that he had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle
because he was only a passenger. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy and no posses-
sory interest in the automobile. The court also said the defendant abandoned the briefcase.
Although the abandonment theory makes more sense, both are questionable. The dissent
properly recognizes that presence in the vehicle should be a sufficient basis for granting
standing under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See text accompanying note 239
infra. The abandonment theory depends upon finding a giving up of possession and control.
It is questionable whether items discarded or left behind by individuals when they are being
chased by the police are given up in a manner which would justify not applying the amend-
ment. Normally there will be no search since the item will be in plain view when discarded.
158. Supra note 150. The plurality in Cardwell used extreme language in precluding
fourth amendment protection. Although the plurality stated that there was probable cause,
it also suggested that since the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
paint on his car (perhaps because it is in plain view), there is no fourth amendment right of
the defendant involved. The plurality seems to ignore any notions of property interests being
protected by the fourth amendment. See Stewart dissenting, 94 S.Ct. at 2473. See text
accompanying notes 266-270 infra. It is also questionable whether the chemical analysis of
the paint is any less a search than is an ex-ray of the body or of luggage. See also Mancusi v.
Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (papers); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (com-
munications).
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is not a search, that the taking of the paint was not a seizure, and
therefore that neither was subject to the fourth amendment.
Defining the exact limits of the terms "search" and "seizure"
is exceptionally difficult. It is especially complicated because the
Court must keep in mind the effect of calling a particular activity
a search. Until recently, if the government sought to use evidence
obtained by search or seizure in a criminal case, the search or sei-
zure had to be justified by probable cause.'59 If there was no prob-
able cause, the search or seizure was invalid and in most cases, the
evidence could not be used at trial if the defendant's rights had been
violated.' 0 Holding that a search or seizure occurred was, therefore,
significant because substantial justification was required and even
slight violations resulted in exclusion of evidence.' 1 Such severe
consequences probably prompted the Court to be very careful in
finding that a search or seizure occurred. As will be observed later,
however, the Court is now allowing more flexibility in the justifica-
tion required for a search or seizure and is limiting the scope of the
exclusionary rule." 2 These changes will make consideration of the
159. Terry v. Ohio, supra note 124, was pehraps the first major inroad on the probable
cause requirement. In Cady v. Dombrowski, supra note 135, one becomes aware of a shift in
emphasis when reading the Court's opinion. The opinion speaks of probable cause only when
quoting the fourth amendment. All other references to the required amount of justification
are to the word "reasonable."
160. See Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) where
Justice Holmes stated that the prohibition was not merely on the use of the evidence in a
criminal trial, but that it should not be used at all. The only major exceptions to this were
the doctrines of collateral use for impeachment, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954),
and evidence acquired which was not "tainted" by the illegal search. See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963). Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) suggests that the exclusionary rule is being substantially
limited.
161. Exclusion is a severe penalty because it may result in a criminal going free in many
cases. Exclusion does not require that the individual conducting the search have bad motives.
For a strong criticism of the exclusionary rule, see VIII J. WMORE, EVmENc §2184a (3rd
ed. 1940). But see Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review, An Argument for
Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129 (1973) (where the
author suggests that judicial integrity rather than deterrence is the main justification for the
rule). See also Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974)
for an interesting compromise approach.
162. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1973); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Harris v. New York, 410 U.S. 222 (1971).
Although these cases do not involve the fourth amendment, they indicate a growing dissat-
isfaction with the exclusionary rule. It is expected that these limitations, especially the
impeachment rationale of Harris, will be applied in fourth amendment cases. See Dershowitz
& Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971). If the exclusionary rule is eliminated,
some other remedy must be found to insure that the fourth amendment cannot be violated
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underlying scope of the fourth amendment less difficult.
IV. REMEDIES
The preceding discussion of the scope of the amendment pro-
vides a basis for determining when a defendant's rights have argu-
ably been violated, but the availability of a remedy is one of the
most important considerations since rights without remedies are
illusory.
In the 1700's, common law causes of action would lie for activi-
ties of the Crown which the courts deemed to be illegal invasions of
property rights163 and privacy rights." 4 If an individual were arrested
without proper justification, he had a valid cause of action for false
imprisonment. 1 5 For a breach of the security of his home, he could
maintain trespass. 6' For improper seizure of his goods, he could
maintain an action of replevin. 6' These causes of action were al-
lowed against officials who attempted to justify their activities by
showing that they had warrants for arrest or search."6 ' Additional
modern remedies have been developed which may also prove useful
in cases involving violations of the fourth amendment. The Court
has allowed civil actions seeking damages6 9 and suits for injunc-
tions170 against federal officials for fourth amendment violations. 42
U.S.C.A. section 1983 provides for remedies against individuals
who, acting under color of state law, violate an individual's fourth
amendment rights.17' These newer remedies are not limited to prop-
163. See Huckle v. Money, supra note 29.
164. Entick v. Carrington, supra note 35. Privacy considerations were primarily related
to aggravation of the damages. For an interesting discussion of the civil law of privacy and
its early development, see Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890). See also Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 16 (1974).
165. Entick v. Carrington, supra note 35.
166. Huckle v. Money, supra note 29.
167. See text accompanying notes 170-180 infra. Replevin was not the only remedy,
however, as conversion was also available for damages. For modem equivilents see D. DOBBS,
REMEDIES § 5.14 (1973). See also ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRoCEDuRE § 280.3
(Official Draft #1), dealing with motions for return of seized property.
168. This is exactly the situation presented in both Entick v. Carrington and Huckle
v. Money, supra notes 29, 35.
169. Bivins v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Justice Harlan's con-
curring opinion; Jennings v. Nexter, 217 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 958
(1955).
170. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, - U.S. - , 94 S.Ct. 1494 (1974).
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Bivins, supra note 169, at 402, provides an excellent
analysis of the Court's power to grant appropriate equitable relief for constitutional infringe-
ments. See also Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
171. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Madison v. Manter, 441 F.2d 537 (1st
Cir. 1971), the court, although finding § 1983 applicable to redress violations of the fourth
amendment, held that negligence was not sufficient if good faith is established. See also
Lanhford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (injunction under § 1983).
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erty rights as were many of the common law causes of action.
The remedies for illegal searches and seizures have undergone
continual change. The common law suit in replevin gave rise to the
present-day requirement for a motion to suppress in fourth amend-
ment cases.'72 Replevin is an action for the return of goods.' In
replevin, the plaintiff must show that his right to present possession
of the goods is superior to the defendant's. 74 If the police acquire
goods illegally, the prior possessor has the superior right of posses-
sion' unless the goods are contraband.7 6 If the goods are not contra-
band or something in which there is no right to possession,1" they
must be returned despite the fact that they are evidence, an instru-
mentality, or fruit of the crime. 17 Even as to stolen goods, the police
are generally not allowed to retain them on the basis of some third
person's right of possession. 7 Good faith is no defense.'
172. Some authors suggest that the exclusionary rule is a limited remedy and actually
promotes police perjury. See Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DiExo
L. REV. 839 (1974).
173. Replevin is a legal, as opposed to an equitable remedy, and is "a personal action
ex delicto brought to recover possession of goods unlawfully taken. . . the validity of which
taking is the mode of contesting, if the party from whom the goods were taken wishes to have
them back in specie. . . ." BLACK'S LAW DicTIoNARY 1463-64 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). Replevin
includes a right to damages. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 1. See also E. WELS, REPLnVm (2d ed.
1907) (hereinafter cited as WELLS). "Goods" are personal property but generally do not in-
clude intangibles, animals, or interests in land. See BLAcK's LAw DICONARY 823 (Rev. 4th
ed. 1968).
174. The theory of relativity of title is important in replevin. See WELLS, note 173 supra,
at 55-56. See also Bank de France v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 60 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1932); King v.
McCrory, 175 So. 193 (Miss. 1937); Robinson v. Poole, 232 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1959); Smith v.
Barrick, 85 N.E.2d 101 (Ohio 1949); WELis, supra note 173, at 56.
175. See Gumbell v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (1888); Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884);
WELS, supra note 173, at 56 and §§ 244-45. See also note 173 supra. The action was good
against both federal and state officers, but had to be brought in the proper court. See Freeman
v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1825). The law enforcement official was treated much the
same as a private person except that the goods were not returned upon posting of a bond. No
return was authorized until the right to replevin was actually litigated. WELLS, supra note
173, at §§ 243.45.
176. See, e.g., Clark v. Holden, 2 So.2d 570 (Miss. 1941) (gambling equipment); Zales
v. Matowitz, 8 Ohio Supp. 66, 41 N.E.2d 708 (1942) (pinball machines); 77 C.J.S. Replevin
99 9.18.
177. See, e.g., Keyes v. Konkel, 119 Mich. 550, 78 N.W. 649 (1899) (dead body). See
also WELLs, supra note 173, at 26.
178. See Gunn v. Williams, 246 EL. App. 494 (1972); Colburn v. Colburn, 211 S.W. 248
(Texas 1919).
179. This is the doctrine of Jus Tertii, which is applicable even to the government. The
situations in which the defendant in a replevin action could assert others' rights was ex-
tremely limited, and he could never do so if he was a trespassor. Van Barlin v. Dean, 27 Mich.
104 (1873); WELLS, supra note 173, at 76. It is also unlikely that the true owner could be joined
or interpleaded under the present rules of civil procedure. See McCormick v. Tipton, 259 F.2d
913 (6th Cir. 1958). See also Turner v. Pierson-Hollowell Walnut Co., 260 Ill. App. 158 (1930);
Raber v. Hyde, 138 Mich. 101, 101 N.W. 61 (1904); WELLs, supra note 173, at § 276.
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Historically, the replevin action was kept separate from the
criminal prosecution. The return of illegally seized goods was
deemed a "collateral issue" which could not be litigated in a crimi-
nal action."' Courts would not inquire into the source or the means
of acquisition of the evidence because it was considered irrelevant
to the issue of guilt or innocence.'82 By maintaining replevin, how-
ever, a criminal defendant could regain the illegally seized property
and, as a consequence, preclude its use as evidence in his criminal
trial until such time as the property was legally reacquired by the
government.' 3
In Weeks v. United States,"4 the Court refused to allow the
replevin remedy to be circumvented and ordered the return of
goods. The defendant had been denied in a separate civil suit for
replevin the return of his goods which had been illegally seized. At
the criminal trial, the defendant had renewed his motion for return
of the goods. On appeal, the Supreme Court, recognizing that the
defendant had done everything he could to obtain civil relief, or-
dered the goods returned.
In a subsequent case, Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United
States, 5s a replevin action for the return of illegally seized docu-
ments had been successful, but the government had retained copies
180. Caldwell v. Arnold, 8 Minn. 265 (1862); Lewis v. Buck, 7 Minn. 104 (1862). See
also WE iS, supra note 173, at § 276.
181. See Cogen v. United States, 268 U.S. 200 (1929), in which the Court evaluated the
history of the collateral issue rule and repudiated it completely in fourth amendment cases.
182. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S.
200 (1920); Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also S.
GPEENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 254a (13th ed. 1876).
183. The practical effect of winning a replevin or other civil action with respect to the
illegal police activities appears to have been the dropping of charges. Once the individual had
managed to secure a return of the goods, they had to be relocated before the police could
reacquire them. After Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), they probably could not
be reacquired by subpoena since that would violate the defendant's fifth amendment rights.
Until Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the mere evidence rule was a substantial
obstacle in many cases to obtaining a search warrant. The Court had previously held that
warrants could issue only "when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in
the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or
in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken."
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). A warrant would not issue for the purpose
of merely searching for evidence which is not contraband, or the fruits or instrumentalities
of crimes. Warden abolished this mere evidence rule.
184. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks is frequently cited as the case establishing the exclu-
sionary rule. This is accurate to the extent it recognizes that Weeks was the first major case
to exclude evidence for a violation of the fourth amendment. Weeks did not, however, hold
that evidence could be excluded for any constitutional violation.
185. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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and sought to use the information contained therein at the criminal
trial. Holmes, writing for the Court, held the copies inadmissible as
evidence, using his now famous language that the evidence "shall
not be used at all." ' The Court recognized that the vitality of the
fourth amendment would be undermined by too narrow an interpre-
tation of the right to a return of the goods and suggested that to
maintain judicial integrity the courts should not overlook the fact
that the police have acted in a manner inconsistent with the Consti-
tution.'7 In Gouled v. United States,'88 the defendant was unaware
of the seizure until the evidence was offered in the criminal trial.
He then promptly filed a motion for return of the goods and to
prohibit their use. The Court recognized that the defendant had
acted as promptly as possible to seek return of the goods and should
not be penalized merely because the government's conduct had pre-
cluded his knowledge of the illegal search and seizure prior to the
criminal trial.
In Agnello v. United States,'9 the fourth amendment issue was
raised by a motion to suppress the evidence without an accompany-
ing motion for its return. In each of the preceding cases, the defen-
dant raised as soon as he was able a claim for return of the goods
on a replevin theory. Relief was granted in Agnello because the
Court expressly recognized that the primary issue was exclusion and
that exclusion should not be denied because no formal request for
return of the property had been made. Finally, in Cogen v. United
States,9 ' the Court held that the denial of a motion to suppress is
not an appealable order since it is not a collateral issue. The Court
thereby completely eliminated the collateral issue doctrine and
firmly established the exclusionary rule' and the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree doctrine. 9 2
The development of the exclusionary rule was instrumental in
creating much of the litigation dealing with the issues of the scope
of the fourth amendment and standing. Although standing is rele-
vant in any lawsuit dealing with the issue of whether a particular
individual's fourth amendment rights have been violated, the exclu-
sionary rule prompted such litigation. Criminal defense lawyers
186. Id. at 392.
187. This later developed into the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Harrison v.
United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
188. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
189. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
190. 278 U.S. 221 (1929).
191. See, e.g., Go Cart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
192. Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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raised the issue when they could see a direct benefit for their clients
by excluding damaging evidence from trial. This resulted in a great
deal of litigation on the issue of whether a particular defendant's
fourth amendment rights had been violated. The Court solved the
problem as follows: the amendment refers to the right of the people
to be secure in "their" persons, houses, papers, and effects. Al-
though the word "their" is the plural, the Court has not allowed the
defendant to raise a third person's fourth amendment rights. He
may only assert his rights. "His" is a possessive word, meaning the
defendant must have possessed the property being searched or
seized before his interests are protected by the amendment. Posses-
sion is a property concept, so property law is controlling. The early
standing litigation, therefore, involved definitions of property inter-
ests as well as the scope of the amendment.'93
Until recently, if the defendant could show that "his rights were
violated by the search or seizure," he was usually entitled to the
benefit of the exclusionary rule. The court applied the rule almost
as broadly as the scope of the fourth amendment itself.'94 The prob-
lem, however, is that the Court has recently tended to limit the
scope of the exclusionary rule due to a dissatisfaction with the re-
sults. This limitation has taken place in a number of ways: by
rejecting the exclusionary rule because it will not have the desired
deterrent effect;' 9' by deciding that the defendant does not have
standing;"9 and through narrowing the scope of the fourth amend-
ment by saying that no fourth amendment rights are involved or
have been violated.'97 The danger is that this trend will affect the
193. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 360-69 for an excellent discussion of the problems
with this approach. See also pt. VI of this article infra.
194. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co.,
Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). While it is recognized that the scope of the
exclusionary rule has never been fully coextensive with the scope of the fourth amendment,
in recent years the limitations have been more pronounced. See United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971); Bivins v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 688 (1971) (Justice Burger's dis-
sent); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See also Kaplan, The Limits of The
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974) for a good discussion of the issue.
195. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
196. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); White & Greenspan, supra note 1; Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 367.
197. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine not applicable to grand jury); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (grand
jury subpoena for handwriting exemplar not a search); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). See also
Cardwell v. Lewis,__ U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974). The plurality's reliance in Cardwell
on Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), to suggest that property rights are not protected,
is badly misplaced. The language cited related merely to the question whether warrants could
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many other remedies available for violations of the fourth amend-
ment.' 5 Artifically restricting the scope of the fourth amendment
tends to obscure its purpose and limits its effect on government
activities. The exclusionary rule is not an end in itself. Knowing the
scope of the fourth amendment and the extent to which it limits
governmental action is extremely important to a free society. The
standing doctrine is directly related to the scope of the amendment
and, therefore, deciding a particular individual does not have stand-
ing to challenge is a limit on the scope of the amendment. Also,
decisions that a particular activity is not within the scope of the
amendment can be used in future cases as a basis for denying stand-
ing to challenge the activity. It is therefore important to compare
the law of standing as it relates to the fourth amendment with other
standing rules and to develop a theory of standing that is consistent
with the history and purpose of the fourth amendment. Once the
fourth amendment standing rule is brought into line with the gen-
eral rules of standing to assert constitutional rights, the Court can
focus more clearly on the proper scope of the amendment, and de-
velop new rules which are not dependent on the exclusionary rule.
V. GENERAL LAW OF STANDING
In order to evaluate the current law of standing to challenge the
legality of a search or seizure, it is necessary to compare standing
under the fourth amendment with the rules governing standing
needed to raise other constitutional provisions.
The essential attribute of the standing determination has always
been that it was a decison whether to decide-a determination of
whether the validity of the challenged government action should
be passed on for this [person]. A denial of standing did not mean
that the legality of the [government's] action was upheld, that
question was not reached. A grant of standing did not mean that
[the individual] would prevail on the merits, even if he sustained
his factual burden; when the merits were considered, the
[government's] legal position might be sustained."'
be issued for items of merely evidentiary value, and did not concern the basic issue of whether
the fourth amendment protected property interests. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397
U.S. 249 (1970) (cleary recognizing property rights).
198. See text accompanying notes 163-171 supra.
199. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court, A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REV.
645, 669 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Scott). The words "person," "individual" and "govern-
ment" have been substituted in lieu of Scott's terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" for purposes
of clarity. Scott used the term "plaintiff" to indicate the person seeking to challenge, nor-
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In civil cases involving governmental activities challenged on
constitutional grounds, 20 the Court has primarily considered such
things as whether the defendant would have a remedy at common
law, 21 whether the complainant merely suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally,2 2 the directness of the effect
on the person seeking to challenge,2 3 and the extent to which the
government activity affects the person seeking standing.24 Except
for the issue of whether a remedy existed at common law, these
considerations help resolve the question whether the defendant has
a sufficient personal interest in order to ensure that the specific
issue will be properly litigated. The Court has proceeded
mally a defendant in criminal cases. This article is an excellent presentation of the law of
standing generally and is highly recommended for its summary of the present law of standing.
No opinion is expressed as to the feasibility of Scott's functional analysis. Scott does exclude,
however, fourth amendment standing. Standing has also been defined as follows:
more precisely stated the question of standing in this sense is the question whether
the litigant has a sufficient personal interest in getting the relief he seeks or is a
sufficiently appropriate representative of other interested persons to warrant giving
him the relief if he establishes the illegality alleged-and, by the same token, to
warrant recognizing him as entitled to invoke the court's decision on the issue of
illegality.
H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURT iN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 174 (1953).
200. Constitutional grounds must be distinguished from statutory grounds for relief.
If the claim is based on statute, Congress can expressly indicate which individuals were
intended to be protected. Although Congress cannot confer standing where it would result in
the Court being compelled to give advisory opinions, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911), it may indicate that, in its view, certain statutes were intended to protect the individ-
ual against the particular injury being suffered. If the individual can show the injury, the
Court will normally grant standing. See Alton v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942); Scott,
supra note 199, at 655.
201. Scott, supra note 199, at 650. The significance of a common law remedy is im-
portant because the Court often states that the standing issue involves the question of
whether a "case or controversy" is present. If a judicial remedy was historically available,
the claim is one that can be resolved by the courts unless review was subsequently precluded
by a change in the law.
202. Scott, supra note 199, at 652. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2925 (1974); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923)
(taxpayers). Standing is generally denied in such cases because there would be almost no
limit on who could challenge governmental activity. The Court views this as an insufficient
injury and does not recognize any basis at common law for such challenges. The primary
exception to this rule is Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), where the Court allowed standing
to challenge expenditures by a taxpayer where there was an arguable violation of a specific
constitutional limitation. The Court is apparently refusing to expand Flast. United States v.
Richardson, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2940 (1974).
203. Scott, supra note 199, at 652. If the individual is directly affected, he is a member
of a limited group which is distinguishable from individuals who are only consequentially
injured. Therefore the Court is more likely to grant standing. See note 202 supra.
204. Id. at 652. The extent of the effect is very significant in the context of whether the
individual can meet the minimum qualification of having been "injured" by the govern-
mental activity. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Process-
ing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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on the premise that the constitutional or statutory limitation
which [the government] is claimed to have violated should be
thought of not as a restraint on the government or its agents but
as a benefit bestowed on some definable part of society. Thus, the
Court has been able to view [a person] not a member of that
favored group as not possessing a sufficient interest to be allowed
to enforce the limitation.nl
In recent civil cases dealing with standing, the Court has shown a
distinct tendency to expand the concept of standing to allow more
individuals to challenge more kinds of governmental activities. 201
This would appear to be contrary to the manner in which the Court
has approached the standing issue in fourth amendment cases. 211
The net result of the Supreme Court cases on standing, exclud-
ing many exceptions, 208 can perhaps be stated as follows: the first
consideration is whether the defendant was injured by the govern-
mental action he is seeking to challenge. If there is no injury (eco-
nomic, social, aesthetic, conservational, recreational, etc., then
there is no standing.29 The extent of the injury required is minimal.
Sufficient injury can be found if an individual will no longer be able
to use a public recreation area for hiking because of development of
the area 2'0 or because he was refused a drink in a bar.21' If there is
injury, it must be one that is cognizable in the courts arguably
entitling the injured individual to recover from the government or
to prohibit continuation of the injury. This right to recover from the
government or to prohibit the injury may be derived from any of
three sources: history,212 statutes, '21 3 or the Constitution.2 14 Injury
alone is not sufficient to grant standing.25 The person seeking to
205. Scott, supra note 199, at 654.
206. Id. at 646.
207. Although there has been some expansion of standing in criminal cases in the last
15 years, the more recent approach is to limit it. See pt. VI of this article.
208. Although the Court has recently relied on Association of Data Processing Serv.
Org. v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (hereinafter cited Data Processing) more often, there are
still many exceptions. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
209. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2925(1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Data Processing, supra note 208.
210. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
211. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
212. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
213. See Data Processing, supra note 208.
214. See Data Processing, supra note 208; Flast v. Cohen, supra note 212. See also
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
215. See Data Processing, supra note 208. Not all injuries entitle an individual to a
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challenge, not some third person, must himself have been injured,1
and the injury must be historically capable of judicial resolution 217
or be related to a constitutional or statutory provision which pro-
vides protection against that specific type of injury.218 These criteria
are collectively referred to as the Data Processing test.1 9
These requirements take on particular significance in the
fourth amendment area because the use of the evidence in the crim-
inal trial is not an injury for the purposes of standing. In order to
have standing to raise fourth amendment rights the individual must
show that he has been injured by the search or seizure (invasion of
property or privacy rights), not merely by use of the evidence. The
injury must either be one which was recognized as historically cap-
able of judicial resolution and for which there exists a remedy220 such
as a common law action for damages for trespass, 21 replevin, or
trover, 22 or there must be some statutory or constitutional provision
that was intended to protect the individual from the specific type
of injury which was inflicted by the government. 223
These general standing requirements place some limits on ac-
cess to the courts and the creation of new theories of recovery.2 24 If
the cause of action has been litigated in the past, there is some merit
to the contention that there is sufficient interest to insure adverse-
ness and substantial reason to entertain the suit.225 Historically cap-
able of judicial resolution does not mean at common law only, it
relates merely to the past. Where there was no cause of action to
challenge this specific governmental activity in the past, the courts
will not expand the remedies or relief available to individuals who
are injured by governmental action unless there is a good reason to
remedy. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), where the destruction of an individ-
ual's trees without compensation did not constitute a taking because there was a valid
regulation permitting it. There are many similar examples of regulations or activities which
injure people but for which they are not entitled to any remedy other than the ballot.
216. See Sierra Club v. Morton, supra note 210. There are exceptions to the requirement
that the party seeking relief must have been injured. See cases cited in note 208 supra; Note,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARv. L. REV. 423 (1974).
217. See Data Processing, supra note 208.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. The remedy need not be money damages. It could be equitable relief.
221. See Huckle v. Money, supra note 29, and Entick v. Carrington, supra note 35.
222. See text accompanying notes 163-168 supra.
223. See Data Processing, supra note 208.
224. The Court has regularly expressed concern in standing cases over the constitu-
tional requirement of separation of powers and access to the courts. See Schlesinger, supra
note 209; Scott, supra note 199, at 669.
225. See Flast v. Cohen, supra note 208. A case or controversy is required.
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do so."' The reasons currently accepted by the Court for expansion
are basically two-fold-i) Expand if there is some statute which is
intended to prevent this injury to the person who is seeking to
challenge"' or 2) Expand if there is a constitutional provision which
is intended to prevent this injury to the individual. 28 In other words,
if there is some specific statutory or constitutional provision which
arguably220 was intended to protect the individual against the type
of injury inflicted, a judicial remedy should be available to insure
that the statutory or constitutional provision is followed by govern-
ment and does not become meaningless. 230 The constitutional or
statutory provision must, however, be directed toward specific types
of injuries and must contemplate rights of individuals before the
Court will allow standing on this basis.2sl
The requirement that the rights to individuals be involved is
what prevents the Court from granting standing merely because the
Congress arguably went beyond the power granted by the Constitu-
tion.232 The powers granted in article I, section 8, for example, are
limits on the federal government, but are not aimed at any particu-
lar type of injury to an individual nor to specific abuses of individual
rights.2" They are merely declaratory of the source and scope of
federal power without regard to any possible abuse as such. Consti-
tutional limitations, however, such as first, fourth, and fourteenth
amendments, the limits on suspending the writ of habeas corpus,'
and the prohibition on ex post facto laws were implemented because
226. See note 208 supra. Of course, if the issue was subject to litigation in the past only
because of a statute or constitutional provision which has been repealed, the precedent will
be of little value.
227. This was the issue in Data Processing, supra note 208. The Court found that a
statute was intended to protect individuals in plaintiff's position against the type of injury
plaintiff suffered.
228. See Data Processing, supra note 208. The rationale is the same as in statutory
cases, except that the Court may be even more willing to grant standing in constitutional
cases;
229. Standing merely gives the individual the right to litigate the issue. The test for
standing is, of necessity, whether this individual is "arguably" within the class of people
sought to be protected. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Scott, supra
note 199, at 665-66.
230. Assuming the existence of a right, the courts have generally been inclined to
fashion a remedy to prevent the destruction of the right. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803).
231. See Data Processing, supra note 208.
232. See United States v. Richardson, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2940 (1974).
233. The grant of power was intended as a general limitation in response to a concern
that the federal government would grow too large or become too powerful. The limitations,
while providing benefits to the people, were not directed at specific abuses of individual rights
or specific types of injuries. See Flast v. Cohen, supra note 208.
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of the fear of governmental overreaching in specific areas dealing
with individual freedoms and are therefore specific limitations on
the power of governmentz4 aimed at protecting individual rights
and freedoms against specific types of abuses by government. When
these limitations are violated, the Court is more inclined to grant
standing since a failure to do so could result in these limitations on
governmental action becoming ineffective.3 Although there is sub-
stantial criticism of this approach, it is not unreasonable as it limits
the number of cases brought before the Courtms and limits the abil-
ity of dissatisfied citizens to harass the government.27
One final point is that the determination of standing should
focus on whether a particular party should be allowed to challenge
the legality of certain activity, not whether he will prevail on the
facts or be entitled to any specific remedy. Standing should not be
used as a catch-all for refusing to consider the issue in a particular
forum or because the specific relief requested is not appropriate. As
will become apparent later, the Court does not follow these general
standing rules in deciding fourth amendment standing cases. The
Court has interpreted the injury requirement very narrowly and
does not recognize as a basis for standing many of the injuries
sought to be protected against by the fourth amendment. The Court
apparently does not recognize the historical causes of action such as
trespass, false imprisonment and replevin in their full context. Once
an individual has established that he has suffered an injury by an
activity which comes within the scope of the fourth amendment, he
should be granted standing to challenge the activity that caused the
injury.
VI. THE PROBLEMS
A. Fourth Amendment Standing
Although earlier cases considered the standing problem, 8 it
234. See the discussion of fourth amendment history, text accompanying notes 62-70
supra.
235. The ability of the government to avoid the effect of the fourth amendment was, of
course, the concern of the Court when it decided Silverthorne, supra note 185. See also Justice
Burger dissenting in Bivins v. Six Unknown Agents, supra note 169.
236. See Scott, supra note 199, at 670.
237. The Court has expressed this concern in many cases. See Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War,__ U.S. _, 94 S.Ct. 2925 (1974); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
238. See, e.g., Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2nd Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 858 (1947); White & Greenspan, supra note 1; Steps, Standing to Object to Unreasonable
Search and Seizure, 34 Mo. L. Rsv. 575 (1969); 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488 (1965); Annot., 86
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was first extensively dealt with in Jones v. United States.39 In
Jones, the Court recognized that the fourth amendment protected
interests in privacy24 and expanded fourth amendment standing by
defining injury to include both invasions of privacy and property
interests. Previously, property invasions were required because the
Court interpreted the words "secure in their persons" to mean a
possessory interest in the object of the search or seizure. 21 Jones
recognized the artificiality of such a rule and held that anyone
"legitimately on the premises" had a sufficient interest in that
premises, the invasion of which is a sufficient injury to give rise to
standing to object to a search of the premises.242 The Court did not,
however, eliminate the older concepts which allowed standing based
on violations of property rights. The Court additionally held that a
person charged with a crime of possession automatically has stand-
ing to challenge the search for and seizure of the prohibited item.2 3
A.L.R.2d 984 (1962); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 246 (1961). The cases before Jones allowed standing
only if the defendant could show that he had a possessory or proprietary interest in the
property seized or the premises searched. The courts had limited standing to such interests
and required that the individual be aggrieved by the search or the seizure, not merely by
admission of the evidence. See, e.g., Schnitzer v. United States, 77 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1935).
The latter is still a requirement. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72
(1969).
239. 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (search of a premises in which defendant had no property
interest). Although Jones was an interpretation of FFD. R. CaM. P. 41(e), it is generally
treated and accepted as a definition of the constitutional standing requirement in fourth
amendment cases. Jones involved a definition of the words "person aggrieved." See Combs
v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 227 (1972).
240. This interest had previously been recognized as early as Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), but had not been interpreted to give rise to standing without a showing
of a possessory or propriety interest. See note 238 supra.
241. The language of the fourth amendment implicitly limits it to property interests,
but its history clearly indicates a desire to protect privacy as well. This raises the question of
the extent of the property interest necessary to give an individual a privacy interest in
property. This was the approach taken in Jones. This article will suggest that any minimal
property interest should give an individual a right of privacy entitled to fourth amendment
protection. This property interest should include any right to possess, use, or receive the
benefits of property. It need not be an interest which is protected by the common law or which
can be made the basis of licenses or permits. Both Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224
(1972) and Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), strongly imply that a right of privacy
may exist without any corresponding property interest. While this is not inconsistent with
the historical purpose of protecting privacy interests, it does expand the literal interpretation
of the words. What is incongruous, however, is the expansion in Jones, Katz, Mancusi, and
Combs and the limitations in Couch, Dionisio, Mara, Cardwell, and Brown.
242. 362 U.S. at 267.
243. Id. at 264. Automatic standing merely means that the defendant has standing
without having to offer proof that his interests were invaded. Without automatic standing, a
defendant charged with a possessory crime faced a dilemma. If he claimed possession of the
prohibited item in order to gain standing to challenge a search and seizure, he admitted guilt;
if the defendant did not claim possession, he could not challenge the search and seizure. This
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In Simmons v. United States,44 the Court recognized that owner-
ship of an item offered in evidence was sufficient to confer stand-
ing.245 This view is clearly consistent with history26 and the Data
Processing rule. In wiretapping cases the Court has granted stand-
ing to all parties to the taped conversation2 47 and, it is assumed, to
the particular individual whose telephone is tapped 28 on the theory
that this is much the same as if his house had been searched. This
is also consistent with history and the general standing rule because
there is, according to the Court, a right of privacy with respect to
telephone calls and invasions of that right involve the fourth amend-
ment. The most recent criminal case involving standing however,
has muddied the waters, primarily because the language appears to
impose artificial limits on standing.
In Brown v. United States,249 the defendant charged with the
transportation of stolen goods claimed automatic standing to chal-
lenge the legality of the seizure of those goods. 210 The stolen goods
were seized in the warehouse of an accomplice; the defendant
claimed no possessory interest in the goods at the time of the sei-
zure. 251 The Court held that the defendant lacked standing to con-
test the search and seizure,2 2 stating that:
in deciding this case, therefore, it is sufficient to hold that there is
no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, the
defendants (a) were not on the premises at the time of the con-
tested search and seizure; (b) had no proprietary or possessory
interest in the premises, and (c) were not charged with an offense
that includes as an essential element of the offense charged, pos-
problem no longer exists since Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), which held
that testimony given by a defendant at a pretrial hearing to establish standing may not be
used against him at trial.
244. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
245. Id. at 391. In Simmons, the police searched the house of the defendant's mother
and seized therein two suitcases filled with evidence relating to a bank robbery.
246. See text accompanying notes 163-68 supra. The fourth amendment was clearly
intended to protect property interests.
247. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This was the first time the Court
purported to grant standing purely on the basis of an invasion of privacy. Katz may also be
viewed as involving an infringement on privacy in a particular place (container) in which the
defendant has a property interest. Prior cases required an infringement on defendant's
property interests. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See also Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
248. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
249. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
250. Id. at 227.
251. Id. at 228.
252. Id. at 229.
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session of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search
and seizure.23
This basic three-pronged standard of standing can be described as
follows: The Court recognized that the fourth amendment protects
both privacy and property rights. With respect to privacy interests,
any individual legally present during a search of a premises has
standing to object to the search and seizure because his right of
privacy in the premises is involved.2' The Court also granted stand-
ing to an individual who has a proprietary or possessory interest in
the searched premises. The Court recognized that an individual has
an expectation of privacy in his home when he is not there.255 Part
(c) of the Brown rule is the concept of the automatic standing set
forth in Jones.2 5 In Brown, however, the Court suggested that the
automatic standing rule may be unnecessary 7 in light of Simmons
v. United States,28 which held that evidence of possession offered
by the defendant to establish standing during a motion to suppress
could not be used against him at trial on the issue of guilt.2 Foot-
note number four in Brown went even further and suggested that
the defendant must legitimately possess (whatever that means) the
property in order to base standing on property interests. Although
the Brown decision is correct since the defendants had no possessory
interest whatsoever in the evidence seized and no privacy interest
in the area searched, the language of the opinion seems to recognize
only limited possessory rights and also limits the individual's right
to privacy to situations where he is present on or has a possessory
interest in a premises"'0 searched. The Court's use of the term pre-
mises would seem to exclude privacy interests in papers and effects.
This perhaps too narrowly defines the expectation of privacy which
is protected by the fourth amendment, '1 and is not consistent with
253. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
254. The result is correct since a visitor usually expects to have a right of privacy in
his host's premises which should not be invaded unreasonably.
255. The result is also correct. The owner of property does not give up privacy interests
in the property merely because he is not present.
256. See note 243 and accompanying text supra.
257. 411 U.S. 229. The Court reserved decision on that question until the proper case.
258. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
259. Id. at 394.
260. The Court in both Brown and Jones did not appear to recognize any privacy rights
in persons, papers, or effects. The Court has recognized personal privacy in other decisions,
so it is not necessary to read the cases that narrowly. However, even in United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) the court did not specifically recognize a right of privacy in all
containers (a box in the mail).
261. See note 254 supra.
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the Data Processing rule. The courts have held, for example, that
an individual whose property is stored at another's house does not
have standing0 2 even though most would admit that such an indi-
vidual would reasonably have expected privacy. The requirement in
order to have standing after Brown would appear to be that the
individual be legitimately on the premises (the house?, car?, ga-
rage?, boat?, tent?, casket?, or other people container?) searched,
or have a legitimate right of possession in the premises searched, or
have legitimate possession or ownership of the property seized. But,
if possession must be legitimate, may the police, with no fourth
amendment restrictions, seize all contraband, stolen goods, or other
property which the defendant has no right to possess? Making pri-
vacy rights depend on the defendant being legitimately where he is
makes some sense, but property rights are not dependent on the
legitimacy of the possession except with respect to people with a
better right of possession. The fourth amendment would provide
little protection to property rights if the government can, after the
fact, get around the amendment by showing the defendant's inter-
ests were not legitimate. In California Banker's Association v.
Shultz213 and O'Shea v. Littleton,2 4 the Court denied standing
based on the absence of an injury, thus implicitly recognizing the
viability of the Data Processing rule in fourth amendment cases. " '
It is expected that the Court will ultimately adopt that rule. At
present, however, the Court does not allow standing to challenge
whenever the defendant's fourth amendment rights, as reasonably
defined, have arguably been violated. The Court has created artifi-
cial rules apparently designed to limit the exclusionary rule.
It might be helpful at this point, before discussing some of the
recent cases dealing with the scope of the amendment, to set out
precisely the interrelationship between standing and scope. If an
individual is denied standing to challenge a search or a seizure, he
is excluded from any protection which the amendment provides,
and is beyond the scope of the amendment. If an activity is deemed
to have been a search or a seizure as to a particular individual, that
262. See United States v. Pepe, 247 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1957); Gibson v. United States,
149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945); cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1972) (tax records
in accountant's office; no privacy right). But see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968).
263. - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 1494, at 1521-22 (1974).
264. - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974).
265. Both cases decided fourth amendment issues by finding there was no injury and,
therefore, denied standing to certain parties.
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individual must have standing to challenge, otherwise the amend-
ment would be meaningless as to that person. If it is decided that
the amendment does not cover a particular activity because that
activity is not a search or a seizure, or that it is not a search or
seizure of this individual's person, house, papers, or effects because
he does not have the requisite interest in those items, that decision
can be used in future cases to deny standing to challenge to persons
similarly situated. Therefore, decisions on each issue are directly
relevant to the other, and the only time the decision on standing
does not affect the scope is when standing is granted, since that only
means that the defendant is entitled to litigate the issues. The grant
of standing does not mean that he will win, or that the activities
challenged are searches or seizures, or that he has the requisite
relationship to the activity.
B. Recent Scope Cases
In the past few years, the Court has decided some cases dealing
with the basic issues underlying the scope of the amendment. They
have addressed such questions as "what is a search," "what is a
seizure," and the extent to which the amendment protects property
and privacy interests. In Cardwell v. Lewis, 66 a plurality of the
Court held that the warrantless examination upon probable cause
of the exterior of the defendant's automobile and the taking of paint
samples was reasonable and therefore did not violate the fourth
amendment.2"' The plurality opinion suggested, however, that be-
cause the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the exterior
of his automobile, the police's examination of the exterior of the
automobile including the analysis of the paint, was not a
"search."2 8 The opinion further suggests that the fourth amend-
ment protects only privacy interests and does not protect property
interests unless there is an associated expectation of privacy. This
proposition runs directly counter to Simmons v. United States,"9 in
which the Court specifically recognized that the fourth amendment
protects property rights as well as privacy rights. 20 If a majority of
266. - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974).
267. Id. at.., 94 S.Ct. at 2470.
268. Id. at , 94 S.Ct. at 2468. But see Justice Stewart's dissent, 94 S.Ct. at 2473.
The Court said that the fourth amendment protects people, not things, but seemed to over-
look the fact that the amendment was clearly intended to protect peoples' interests in things
and places.
269. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
270. Id. at 391. Simmons did not substantially deal with that issue. The point was
argued, but the Court merely stated that testimony of ownership was a good method of
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the Court adopts the viewpoint expressed in Cardwell, it will have
taken a substantial step back from the letter and the spirit of the
fourth amendment. In Cardwell, there was a seizure of the automo-
bile and paint which clearly should come within the language of the
fourth amendment. The plurality seems to confuse searches, which
involve the plain view doctrine, with seizures, suggesting that if
there was no search there is no fourth amendment issue. The lan-
guage although dictum, implies that some members of the Court are
prepared to make some major changes in the interpretation of the
amendment. If their view becomes generally applicable, the police,
without justification under the fourth amendment, could seize any-
thing within their sight, an absurd result.
In Couch v. United States,2"' the Court held that because the
petitioner had no expectation of privacy in the records she delivered
to her accountant, she had no fourth amendment protection against
an Internal Revenue Service summons directing the accountant to
produce the records."' The Court distinguished Boyd v. United
States,"3 because the defendant in Boyd had possession of the in-
voice at the time of the government's subpoena duces tecum, while
in Couch the defendant had relinquished possession to her accoun-
tant. Although actual possession is crucial to the fifth amendment
issue of whether one is forced to incriminate himself by his own
conduct (personally surrendering his records), the right to immedi-
ate possession or ownership should be the touchstone in analyzing
fourth amendment rights. The Court, however, did not differentiate
between the fourth and fifth amendment claims.25 The Court ap-
peared to deny fourth amendment protection because the defendant
had little expectation of privacy in the records since much of the
information contained therein was subject to mandatory disclosure
in her income tax return.276 The Court also seemed to ignore the
physical seizure of the records, which involves an infringement on
establishing standing. The Court's primary concern was with the self-incrimination dilemma.
See also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention of a package by the
post office is a seizure subject to fourth amendment control).
271. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
272. Id. at 335-36.
273. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
274. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973).
275. Id. at 325 n.6. "[The fourth amendment] claim is not further articulated and does
not appear to be independent of her fifth amendment claim."
276. Id. at 335. This is a rather broad statement by the Court. It would seem that there
should not be only an expectation of privacy in that case, but also a right of privacy that
should not be subject to unreasonable invasion.
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possessory and proprietary rights. In United States v. Dionisio ,277
the Court held that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury for the
purpose of providing a voice exemplar is not a "seizure" of the per-
son in the fourth amendment sense,2  but admitted that the com-
pelled production of records by a subpoena duces tecum is governed
by the fourth amendment requirement that it be reasonable. The
Court also held that the fourth amendment does not protect against
the government's taking of voice exemplars because an individual
has no expectation of privacy in the sound of his voice. 5 Both
Couch and Dionisio restrict the amendment by holding certain con-
duct which would appear to be within the express language of the
amendment is outside its scope. Cardwell then further suggests that
the amendment does not protect property interests at all.
C. Summary
The problems with Brown, Couch, Dionisio, and the plurality
opinion in Cardwell is that they overlook the two most basic fourth
amendment concepts: first, that the seizure of an individual's per-
son, house, papers, or effects gives rise to the question whether the
seizure was legal (seizures primarily invade property interests);s2O
and second, that a search of an individual's person, house, papers,
or effects gives rise to an issue of the validity of the search (searches
primarily invade privacy interests).2' The fourth amendment pro-
277. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
278. Id. at 9.
279. Id. at 14.
280. Some of the recent cases, such as Cardwell and Couch, suggest that it is necessary
to have an invasion of both property and privacy interests. That is inconsistent with the
history of the amendment, which clearly indicates that property interests alone are sufficient.
Seizures of persons, houses, papers and effects are interferences with potsessory rights (prop-
erty) and therefore the individual must have a right of possession before the seizure is in
violation of his fourth amendment rights. That is the justification for denying standing when
the property has been rented, sold, or abandoned. See Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d
450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958); Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.
1943). Although some cases speak of actual possession at the time of the seizure, Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), others recognize that it is a right of possession that is
important, United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). It appears somewhat artificial
to require actual physical possession. The interest protected is the right of possession. The
distinction seems to turn on the common law remedy of replevin which required an immediate
right of possession. See notes 172-80 supra. But that overlooks other property causes of action.
281. The privacy right, though more difficult to deal with, involves basically the same
considerations. The Court has recognized that the amendment protects privacy rights, but
appears to have limited privacy to persons, premises, and telephone lines. The privacy rights
should involve persons, houses (premises), papers, and effects. Therefore, if an individual has
a right of privacy in any person, house, paper, or effect, his interest should be protected by
the amendment. This privacy interest should be able to be established by showing a posses-
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tects both privacy and property interests. An individual can have a
right of privacy in things he does not own or possess.2s Furthermore,
even though the surface examination of an object in plain view may
not constitute a "search" under the fourth amendment, the item
nevertheless remains protected under the fourth amendment from
unreasonable seizures and unreasonable opening and looking into
the object. Whenever the defendant's privacy or property interests
are interfered with by either a search or a seizure, this should
constitute the requisite injury for purposes of standing. The Court
should first decide whether there is a fourth amendment issue, and
then reach the issue of whether the search or seizure was reasonable.
The Court seems to assume that there can be no invasion of
protected privacy unless there is a search of a premises,2s4 a per-
son,2  or a tapping of a telephone line.286 The Brown test, for exam-
ple, when applied to non-possessory crimes requires that an individ-
ual be present on or have a possessory interest in the premises
searched before he has standing to invoke the fourth amendment. s
Brown appears to recognize an individual's right of privacy in
personal property only when it is associated with a premises. To
require the existence of a premises, however, severely limits the
scope of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment also ex-
pressly protects against unreasonable searches of papers and ef-
sory interest in the thing searched, and should not depend on the individual's presence on
the premises at the time of the search, nor should the right depend on common law property
concepts. See note 282 infra.
282. There were many common law property interests other than actual ownership or
possession. Property rights are relative. See notes 172-80 supra. If a friend lets me use his
garage for my car and I have access, I have a property interest in the garage. That interest
can admittedly be terminated at will by my friend, but may not be terminated by others.
The fact of my presence, or having a key to the garage seems irrelevant. I would also expect
some degree of privacy.
283. The Court should ask, was there arguably a search or a seizure of a person, house,
paper, or effect, and did it involve this individual's property or privacy right? See Mancusi
v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). See also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
284. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Invasions of property interests in the
premise would still be sufficient to give standing. Nevertheless, searches of any container
(papers and effects) also invade privacy interests which are protected by the amendment.
285. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
286. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
287. See text accompanying note 249 supra. Privacy interests are clearly protected by
the fourth amendment. There would not normally be a right of privacy, however, unless there
is some minimal property interest. If, for example, I steal a car and the police legally seize
it, I have no right of privacy in the trunk and therefore cannot object to its seizure. If,
however, the police illegally seize the car, my possessory interest has not been overcome and
I retain a right of privacy in the trunk. One must wonder why the presence of the body of the
defendant establishes a sufficient property interest to confer a privacy right, but not presence
of some of his property.
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fects.2s The rationale adopted by the decisions just discussed are
causing significant conceptual problems in understanding the
fourth amendment.
VII. SOME PROPOSALS
The Court, as future cases arise, should undertake to clarify two
specific areas of fourth amendment law. These are: what is a search
or a seizure of a particular individual's person, house, papers and
effects, and; when will a particular individual have standing to
challenge what he claims to be an illegal search and seizure? Ap-
proaching these two problems directly will clarify much of the con-
fusion presently existing in fourth amendment rules.
A. Searches and Seizures
The amendment should apply at any time the government
opens and looks into an individual's container, since such an open-
ing for the purpose of discovering the contents would seemingly
constitute a search. The opening need not be done by government
if it is compelled by them. The question should then be whether the
search was reasonable. Under the present law there is substantial
confusion because a container in the post office is protected, 89 but
papers in an accountant's office are not. 9' This could be resolved by
a clear discussion of the words search and seize.
The Court in determining whether there is a search has spoken
in terms of whether a "reasonable expectation of privacy," was in-
vaded,29 ' but that practice 'should be discontinued. Subjective ex-
pectations are too easily abused. By giving sufficient advance notice
of invasions of privacy, the government could theoretically destroy
an individual's expectation that he will be entitled to any privacy.
Privacy should be considered a constitutional right subject to inva-
288. All articles and containers would seem to come within the historical scope of the
amendment. Any container occupied by people seems to fit within the expression "houses."
Papers and effects should include all personal property, including many sorts of people
containers. If there is an invasion of a right of privacy, persons having some minimal asso-
ciated possessory interest should be granted standing.
289. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
290. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1972).
291. See cases cited in note 153 supra. The Court finds no violation of the fourth
amendment when informers are used, since the defendant is deemed to have waived any
privacy right by talking to the person in front of him. See United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971). Part of the problem is that both Katz and the plurality in Cardwell speak of the
fourth amendment protecting people, not places. What is not pointed out is that the amend-
ment was clearly intended to protect people and their interests in places and things. Katz
recognizes this, but Brown and Cardwell do not seem to.
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sion only upon probable cause or reasonableness. 212 It will, of course,
be necessary for the Court to define this right, but this should not
be too difficult.293 Initially, such a right of privacy for a given indi-
vidual should exist whenever that individual has a possessory inter-
est in the item searched or seized. This possessory interest should
be defined according to constitutional rather than property concepts
and should be recognized as existing any time the individual has the
use of an item or container. The interpretation of the term "their"
persons, houses, papers, and effects should not be narrowly con-
strued to mean "his possession of houses, papers, and effects" rely-
ing solely on property concepts of possession. The approach of Jones
and Katz is more realistic in that it recognizes the interest in pri-
vacy that the fourth amendment was intended to protect.
The Court in recent cases also appears to be overlooking the
clear purpose of the fourth amendment to protect persons and prop-
erty from unreasonable seizures. Since unreasonable seizures of an
individual's person, houses, papers, and effects are prohibited by
the fourth amendment, its protection should be available whenever
the defendant has a possessory interest in the item which is inter-
fered with by the government.294 In Dionisio295 the defendant, a sus-
pect, was held to have no fourth amendment protection against
compelled appearance before a grand jury. Yet this does not appear
to be any less a seizure of his person than the stop on the street that
was subject to the protection of the fourth amendment in Terry v.
Ohio."'5 Short "stops" of the individual are deemed arrests (sei-
zures), so why not short seizures of houses, papers, and effects? In
Dionisio would it not be just as easy to say that, based on the facts,
the seizure was reasonable? If it was not reasonable, is that any
reason to hold the fourth amendment inapplicable? The defendant
was seized by an agency of the government which was investigating
crime. In Couch,27 the defendant had no fourth amendment protec-
292. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 383-84. The author suggests, quite convincingly, that
expectations have no place in the fourth amendment. In order to be viable, it must envision
a right of privacy.
293. The Court has not yet hesitated to define such a right in other constitutional law
cases. See Note, The Constitutional Right of Privacy, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav. 263 (1974).
294. Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974) and Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), suggest that there must be a violation of privacy as well as
property interest before standing can be granted. This is a misinterpretation of the fourth
amendment, because it is not necessary that there be both a search and a seizure before the
reasonableness requirement comes into play.
295. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
296. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The case is best known for permitting what is usually referred
to as "Stop and Frisk."
297. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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tion against the seizure of his records in the possession of his accoun-
tant. The government's acquisition of records which the defendant
has a right to possess at any time would seem no less a seizure than
the potential loss of records in Boyd"' or the detention of defen-
dant's package while it was in the possession of the post office.2 1
Any invasion of a privacy or possessory interest"' in the defendant's
person, house, papers, or effects would seem to come within the
scope of the fourth amendment and constitute an injury."' This
same line of reasoning is applicable to the standing cases. If posses-
sion is an element of the alleged crime or is helpful in proving the
crime and the government alleges that the defendant had posses-
sion, standing should be automatic, not for the reasons stated in
Jones,02 but because the government by attempting to prove posses-
sion is admitting the defendant's possessory interest. The interfer-
ence with such a possessory interest should be deemed a seizure, and
the defendant should have standing to challenge the seizure. The
only exceptions should be where the defendant had given up his
possessory interest prior to the time of the seizure as, for example,
by abandonment"3 or irrevocable transfer 4 to some third person.
B. Standing
The Court's present approach to standing virtually ignores logi-
cal evaluation of the fourth amendment and the concept of stand-
298. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See text accompanying note 88 supra.
299. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
300. Possessory interest is the key. Property rights are basically the rights of people with
respect to things, no person's rights being absolute. Even a fee simple title to land is not
absolute, it can be adversely possessed or acquired by condemnation. The fourth amendment
was an attempt to protect certain interests and a constitutional interpretation of property or
possessory interests is needed, not merely an interpretation that follows the law of property.
Privacy rights merely arise out of possessory interests in something, at least in the context of
searches or seizures. The only exemption would be with respect to such things as voice com-
munications, etc.
301. Assuming the existence of an injury and a right to be free from the injury, a remedy
should be available. The United States Supreme Court has taken the position that rights
necessarily involve a remedy. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Bivins
v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
302. See text accompanying note 243 supra.
303. See note 157 supra. The government may seek to prove defendant's possession at
some time prior to the government's acquisition of the property. If so, possession would not
be important to the standing issue unless the defendant had a possessory interest at the time
of the seizure.
304. .Transfer by sale to a third party fits this category. Transfer by lease could also be
an example. The defendant could be held to have no possessory interest until termination of
the lease or loan agreement. A temporary transfer, on the other hand, should not preclude
standing if the defendant can reacquire the property at any time. See United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). But see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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ing. Although the Court could deny an individual standing to seek
the benefit of the exclusionary rule,0 5 the Court has not dealt with
the standing issue in that context. Many times the Court has denied
standing and limited the scope of the amendment by saying that the
defendant's fourth amendment rights are not involved when it really
meant that the exclusionary rule would not be applied00 or the
search or seizure was reasonable. 07 Standing to litigate and the
scope of the fourth amendment should be considered independently
of the issue of the remedy available. The courts should initially
determine whether the defendant has raised an arguable fourth
amendment violation of his rights, not whether his rights were in
fact violated or whether he is entitled to the benefits of the exclu-
sionary rule. The Court may wish to narrow the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule or to eliminate it altogether. But if the exclusionary rule
is not applicable, 30 the Court should so state and discontinue its
practice of denying the benefits of the exclusionary rule on the
theory that the defendant's rights were not in issue. To do so would
clarify the scope of the fourth amendment, thereby giving courts
and attorneys some guidance in determining whether an individ-
ual's civil rights have been violated. This practice would also permit
the Court to focus more clearly on the purpose of the exclusionary
rule, when it should be applied, and what alternate remedies are
appropriate.
The courts ought to apply the standing rule to the fourth
amendment in the following manner: 0 9 An individual should have
305. White & Greenspan, supra note 1.
306. See note 196 and accompanying text supra.
307. Cardwell v. Lewis, -U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). See also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
308. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); cases cited note 162 supra.
309. Although there is substantial support for the proposition that a criminal defendant
should be able to raise "other's fourth amendment rights," that subject will be left for others
to argue. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d. 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955); This concept is in part
embodied in the AL MODEL CODE OF PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROcEDURE § 290.1 (5) (Official Draft
No. 1, 1972).
A motion to suppress may be made by any defendant against whom things seized
are to be offered in evidence at a criminal trial, if such things were obtained by a
search of or seizure from:
a. the defendant
b. a spouse, parent, child, brother, or sister of the defendant, or any mem-
ber of his household; or
c. any person with whom the defendant resides or sojourns; or
d. a co-defendant, co-conspirator, or any person chargeable with the same
crime with which the defendant is charged; or
1975]
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standing to challenge a search or a seizure of his person, house,
papers, and effects if he: 1) arguably30 had a legal right of privacy
in the article or container searched (whether it be a house, car, box
or envelope) based upon a possessory interest in the container
searched; or 2) arguably had a possessory interest in the item
seized.31' In each case the defendant's possessory right must be supe-
rior to the rights of the individual who may have consented to the
search or seizure.312 Standing should be considered in the context of
whether the defendant has a right to raise the issue, not whether he
should win. Standing should be granted unless the defendant's
claim is totally without merit. If no possessory or privacy right of
the defendant was invaded, standing should be denied because of
the lack of injury. Otherwise, standing should be granted. If there
was an invasion of a privacy or possessory right in the container or
item seized, and that invasion was a search or seizure by govern-
ment, then the activity should be deemed to be within the scope of
the amendment. Only after granting standing should the Court con-
sider whether the invasion was justified under the fourth amend-
ment. If the Court determines that the search or seizure was reason-
able or otherwise appropriate, the defendant is denied relief. If it
was unreasonable, then the issue of the proper remedy becomes
e. any person with whom the defendant conducts a business; or
f. any other person if, from the circumstances, it appears that the search
or seizure was intended to evade the application of this Part If to any of the
persons described in paragraphs (a) to (e) inclusive.
See also § 280.3 dealing with motions for return of property seized.
The ALI comments recommend the retention of a standing rule, but apply it in a manner in
which exclusion of the evidence is the result. A reading of the rule itself suggests it is not
consistent with the basic concept of standing. The rule seems to ignore the fact that standing
is the right to argue an issue, and should be granted when, arguably, defendant's fourth
amendment rights are involved. Although the proposed rule draws more accurate arbitrary
lines, the lines are still arbitrary as they overlook the basic nature of the fourth amendment.
310. The use of the word "arguably" is a modification of the Data Processing rule which
the Court has approved. See note 229 supra.
311. Only a possessory interest should be required. If any such interest arguably exists,
the individual should have the right to argue his case. It would be artificial to require actual
possession and the Court has not normally imposed such a requirement, but the line presently
drawn is very arbitrary. If the defendant's possessory right is not superior to the government's,
it means that the governmental legally acquired the property or the property was contraband
or something there is no right to possess. The issue should turn only on the question of
whether the government legally acquired the property, since the interest is in litigating the
legality of the government activity and not merely return of the property.
312. Although the law of who may consent to a search is unclear, see United States v.
Matlock, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 988 (1974), it should be clear that a person with a superior
property right can consent, thereby waiving any privacy and property rights of the other
possessors. If the government has a possessory interest, it may be able to waive or give up
defendant's rights if action is taken by the right person.
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important. If the exclusionary rule is held inappropriate in a crimi-
nal trial, the Court should base its decision on the grounds that the
criminal trial is the wrong forum for this fourth amendment viola-
tion, that the manner of obtaining evidence is a collateral issue,"'
or that there is no standing to seek the benefit of the exclusionary
rule."4 The Court should not say there is no standing to litigate
fourth amendment rights or that the defendant's rights were not
violated when it means that the exclusionary rule is not applicable
or that the search or seizure was reasonable. If applied as proposed
the standing rule would serve its proper function and be compatible
with the scope of the fourth amendment. 1
Such an approach would be consistent with the general rule of
standing316 and the history of the fourth amendment 317 and would
promote a reasonable interpretation of the scope of the amendment.
There is an injury, an invasion of property or private interests. The
injury was one which, historically, was often capable of judicial
resolution. The fourth amendment is a specific limitation on govern-
ment action intended to protect each individual from unreasonable
searches and seizures which are invasions of his property and pri-
vacy interests in persons, houses, papers, and effects. There are
many possible remedies available for violations of an individual's
fourth amendment rights318 including trespass, 319 false imprison-
313. See text accompanying note 181 supra.
314. This is suggested with the utmost reluctance, since it relates standing to a specific
remedy, which is technically improper. This possibility is mentioned, however, since it would
not cause any substantial confusion if limited to the reasons and scope of the exclusionary
rule and all reference to fourth amendment rights were omitted.
315. As a practical matter very few of the Court's decisions would need to be reinter-
preted. Cases since Jones in which the language is questionable are: Cardwell v. Lewis, -
U.S. _--., 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, - U.S. ___, 94 S.Ct.
1496 (1974); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972); and possibly the line of cases, starting
with Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), which suggested that the
fourth amendment provided only limited protection against judicial and administrative sub-
poenas. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The outcome of these cases would
not necessarily have been different under the proposed standing rule. After granting standing,
the Court still could have decided that the search and seizure were reasonable or that the
exclusionary rule was inapplicable. The Court could also decide that fourth amendment
rights were not in issue and therefore the defendant had no standing, but only based on a
reasonable interpretation of the fourth amendment, not merely because it disfavored a pos-
sible remedy.
316. See pt. V of this article supra.
317. See pt. II of this article supra.
318. See pt. IV of this article supra.
319. See note 166 supra.
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ment, 10 replevin,3 21 trover,32 the exclusionary rule,3r damages,3 24
and possibly even a criminal prosecution 32 against an individual
who invades those rights. The first four of these remedies have been
historically acceptable, involve injury of greater or lesser degree,
and in each case, the individual whose interest is invaded is unques-
tionably within the class of people sought to be protected by the
fourth amendment.32 6 Standing should not be limited by the histori-
cal doctrine of replevin since the only issue was return of the goods.
Standing relates to the right to litigate the legality of the search or
seizure. It must be considered as at least coextensive with the right
and not be limited by the remedies.
C. Summary and Application
A possessory interest in the item seized should give rise to
fourth amendment protection and should entitle an individual to
challenge the reasonableness of the seizure. Actual possession
should not be required so long as there is a right to immediate
possession. Nor should standing or the scope of the amendment
depend on the location of the item when seized. A mere possessory
interest in the item seized would not, however, confer standing to
challenge the search which led to the discovery of that item. Stand-
ing to challenge the search would depend on whether the individual
has a right of privacy in the area searched. One can have a right of
privacy without having possession if he has a possessory interest,3 7
but this right is always subject to being waived by one having a
superior possessory interest in the area searched. Privacy has be-
come extremely important in today's society,32 especially with the
advent of various electronic and other devices that can penetrate
most barriers329 and even give information concerning our real
thoughts.30 The first question, therefore, is what privacy interests
were intended to be protected by the amendment. Clearly the pri-
320. See note 165 supra.
321. See notes 173-80 supra.
322. Id.
323. See notes 184-91 supra.
324. See note 169 supra.
325. See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
326. See parts Im and V of this article supra.
327. See notes 280 and 281 supra.
328. See, e.g., PRIVACY IN A Faa Socry, FIs L REPORT (1974), sponsored by the Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation; A. MIn.L, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY, COMPUT-
Ef.S, DATA BANKS, AND Dossims (1971); Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 384-90.
329. Electronic surveillance, sound amplifying devices, etc.
330. Lie detectors, truth serums, etc.
[Vol. 40
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vacy of the person, the house (premises), papers, and effects (other
property) is protected. Privacy is also a relative matter, some things
are kept secret from all, from a few, or from many. My wife knows
what happens in the bedroom, some friends have free access to and
know what happens in the garage, the neighborhood knows what
happens in the front yard, and my students know what happens in
the classroom. In each case, if a person to whom I have divulged
information or given custody of my property, (assuming he is not a
government agent acting in that capacity) decided to inform others,
or betray that trust, he has invaded my privacy and trust, but the
police have not.3 ' When I willingly make something known to others
I also assume the risk of their telling others.33 So also if I put my
trust in another, and he breaks that trust, there is no violation of
the fourth amendment 3 3 The problem arises when the police, not
occupying a trusted position with respect to my privacy, gain infor-
mation or evidence through means not readily available to the as-
tute public334 or by compelling an individual who is protecting my
privacy to violate it.13 Remember, also, that this right is not abso-
lute, privacy can be invaded when it is reasonable to do so. No
absolute bar to the discovery of evidence is being proposed.
If, for example, a policeman walking along a sidewalk sees my
gun in the front yard and takes it, my interest in the gun should be
protected by the fourth amendment and I should have standing to
challenge the seizure because of my possessory interest in the gun.
There would be no search since the gun was in plain view."' So also,
331. The fourth amendment is only a limitation on governmental activities. See text
accompanying note 130 supra.
332. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion); On Lee v.
United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
333. See cases cited note 332 supra. It is not improper to require individuals to take
some precautions to protect privacy, but there must be a limit. See Amsterdam, supra note
1, at 402-04.
334. This is the problem where, for example, the police enter my house, my car, or my
neighbor's house or car without consent, or use electronic listening devices, or stand on
ladders to look into my windows, etc. These cases must be distinguished from the "plain
view" doctrine. It is recognized that the police should be more diligent, but engaging in such
activities thought proper only for "peeping toms," etc., is questionable. The police should be
required to abide by the law and act consistently with a constitutionally defined right of
privacy.
335. Compelling an individual to invade my privacy would seem no different than the
police doing it themselves. Is it really any different if the compulsion is by force, money, or
subpoena? The issue should be one of reasonableness. In Couch, the subpoena compelled the
accountant to turn over the defendant's records, clearly a seizure and also an invasion of
privacy.
336. The plain view doctrine is not necessarily inconsistent with this approach as there
is no right of privacy if the individual gives it up by doing or saying things in areas or ways
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if I hid my gun in a neighbor's house without his consent and the
police searched his house illegally, I should be able to challenge the
seizure of the gun but not the search of the house, because I had no
right of privacy in the house. If, on the other hand, my neighbor
consented to hide my gun in his house, I would then have a right of
privacy and could contest a search which resulted in the seizure of
my gun. My neighbor, however, could always waive my right of
privacy in his house by consenting to the search."'
Should I place a closed container in my neighbor's house or in
my front yard, I should have standing to contest a search of its
contents. The fact that a container is in plain view should not waive
the owner's right of privacy as to its contents.3 m A house is in plain
view, but its contents are protected. 335 The same rule should apply
to all containers. When the owner of a container consents to allow
an individual to store an item in his container, that individual has
a possessory interest and a right of privacy in the container which
should be protected by the fourth amendment and the individual
should be granted standing to contest a search of its contents lead-
ing to the seizure of his item. The right of privacy should not be
dependent upon the defendant's presence in the container (legiti-
mately on the premises)."'
Although it is difficult to draw fine lines in this area, the Court
should recognize that the attempts made in Brown, Cardwell,
Couch, and Dionisio are not very helpful. The plurality opinion in
that anyone in the area can hear or see. The open fields doctrine is also not inconsistent with
this approach since open fields do not come within the definition of "houses" or "effects."
The Katz decision may be inconsistent since Katz says that the constitution protects people,
not places. The Court has not, apparently, decided to give Katz a broad interpretation. See
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion). If limited to communications,
it may be consistent as it could be deemed merely to recognize that the drafters of the
amendment were very concerned with communications, and telephone wiretapping was not
much of a danger in the 1700's.
337. He could waive my privacy right at any time he desired since he had a superior
possessory interest in the house. He could throw it out in the street, or turn it over to the
police.
338. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion). But see
Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974) (plurality opinion); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
339. See cases cited note 338 supra.
340. See United States v. Koningsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
933 (1964) (garage-no standing). The requirement that defendant be present is not enlighten-
ing. If present in the living room, does he have standing to object to a search of the basement?
But see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), where defendant had just left the
premises. The Court granted standing since the police intentionally delayed until he left. The
issue should be, does he have a legally protected privacy interest, which can turn upon his
having a possessory interest, but not upon his presence.
[Vol. 40
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Cardwell suggested that an analysis of paint chips taken from the
exterior of an automobile did not constitute a "search."34 ' The pro-
posals herein would apply to the facts of Cardwell in the following
manner. The taking of the paint samples would be a seizure. The
item seized need not be valuable. It is the invasion of a property
right which triggers the fourth amendment. The analysis of the
paint would be a search. Had the defendant himself been subjected
to x-ray, it would have been a search.12 Conversations are protected
against unreasonable searches by sound amplification devices
planted at a distance. 43 A right of privacy should exist whenever an
individual's conduct or property is not subject to view by unaided
human senses. The naked eye could not perform a chemical analy-
sis. The chemical analysis should therefore be considered a search.3 4
If the search and seizure were reasonable, the fourth amendment
can be deemed to have been complied with.
In Couch, when the government compelled the accountant to
produce tax records, it at least seized the records and also invaded
an area of taxpayer's privacy, the accountant's office. The accoun-
tant did not waive his client's property or privacy rights and there-
fore the compulsion to produce and the acquisition of the "papers"
constituted a search and a seizure. Standing should be granted.
Saying there was no "right of privacy" without analysis begs the
question. Here, as well as in Cardwell, there was a search and sei-
zure, and privacy should have been due. The decision should have
been based on the issue of reasonableness.
In the period when the Court considered searches made without
probable cause to be unreasonable and applied the exclusionary rule
to almost all fourth amendment violations, the Court was reluctant
to precisely define the scope of the fourth amendment. The courts
were probably adverse to allowing minor infringements by the police
to result in the exclusion of evidence. In some recent cases, however,
the Court has employed a sliding scale for the cause necessary to
make a search reasonable.3 14 As the use of a flexible standard of
341. Cardwell v. Lewis, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2468 (1974).
342. See note 100 supra.
343. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
344. See Cupp v. Murphy, - U.S. , 93 S.Ct. 2000 (1973), where the taking of
dirt from beneath the defendant's fingernails was deemed a search. This is a difficult
area, since the seizure in such cases will be the primary focus of the challenge. If it is
reasonable to seize an item which can be tied to the crime only by chemical, electronic, or
other evaluation, it would also seem reasonable to allow that evaluation.
345. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266 (1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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cause becomes more pronounced, there is less reason to avoid a
precise definition of fourth amendment rights and more reason to
employ an approach consistent with the history and purpose of the
fourth amendment.34 The Court will have to define reasonable lim-
its on the right of privacy and property. In order to accomplish that
goal, the Court should grant standing to anyone whose privacy or
property rights under the fourth amendment have arguably been
violated, and then decide the .scope of the amendment based on
historical and sound policy considerations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It should be apparent that the Court's present interpretation of
the scope of the fourth amendment and the related standing rule is
not consistent with the general rule of standing and is more limited
than the history and meaning of the amendment would suggest it
should be. This has primarily resulted from the Court's attempt to
limit the application of the exclusionary rule. When dealing with
the exclusionary rule, the courts have failed to distinguish fourth
amendment rights from the remedy. This confusion of right and
remedy has substantially confused the standing and scope issues
because the Court has frequently denied the exclusionary rule rem-
edy on the ground that no rights were in issue, when in fact fourth
amendment rights were obviously in question. The advent of addi-
tional civil causes of action and federal prosecution for fourth
amendment violations makes it imperative to consider fourth
amendment rights independently from the exclusionary rule rem-
edy. It is also time to bring the fourth amendment standing rules
into harmony with other standing rules. There is no good reason for
the difference in treatment given to fourth amendment cases by the
Court. Fourth amendment standing should be expanded so that it
is at least consistent with the Data Processing rule. This change
would promote understanding of the scope of the fourth amend-
ment, would lead to more logical and sensible rules, and provide the
courts, police, and public with a comprehensible fourth amend-
ment. Understanding the reason, purpose, and scope of the amend-
ment is helpful in building respect for the Constitution, the law, and
the courts. The proposals herein should promote these goals, and
although they will not solve all problems, should provide some un-
derstanding and logic to an area that many are trying to artificially
simplify. It would also promote honesty in focusing attention on the
real reason for deciding any case, a goal highly beneficial to a free
society.
346. See pt. II of this article.
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